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Abstract 
 
The central question this thesis seeks to answer is: why has there been a change in 
Taiwan’s economic policymaking towards China since the 1990s. The study looks at this 
changing relationship through the lenses of two International Political Economy theories, 
economic nationalism vis-à-vis economic liberalism. By examining three distinctive 
Taiwanese administrations: Lee Teng-hui (1990-1999), Chen Shui-bian (2000-2007) and 
Ma Ying-jeou (2008-Present), this study explores the motivations underpinning Taiwan’s 
different economic policy choices. To illustrate, the study considers internal factors, 
Taiwan’s domestic politics and the role of its business society, and external factors, 
China’s rise in economic, diplomatic and military aspects and an important 
regional/global event. This thesis finds that it is the nationalist goal of protecting Taiwan’s 
security and maintaining its ‘sovereignty’ that has motivated its cross-Strait economic 
policies, and in the case of Taiwan, this nationalist purpose is dependent upon the 
assessment of China’s expanding strength. These findings are important because, as 
the thesis suggests, there is a potential framework to understand the way in which small 
states embrace policy choices reflecting their regional realities with large powerful 
states.  
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Chapter One- Introduction                                                            
The Puzzle of Taiwan’s Changing Economic Policy towards 
Mainland China   
 
Relations between the Republic of China on Taiwan (ROC) and the People‟s Republic of 
China (PRC)1 have long been a contested issue in political science. Since the end of 
Chinese civil war in 1949, the focus of Taiwan-China relationship has centred on the 
conventional security issue. Only in recent years when an economically strong China 
astonished the world, the role of economics and commerce has emerged to be the new 
emphasis on relations across the Strait.  
 
This thesis focuses on Taiwan‟s changing economic policymaking towards China since 
the 1990s, and seeks to find out why there has been such a variation in Taiwan‟s 
cross-Strait policies. Through the lenses of two International Political Economy theories, 
economic nationalism and economic liberalism, this study examines Taiwan‟s different 
cross-Strait policy choices and explains the rationale behind these policies under three 
distinctive Taiwanese administrations: Lee Teng-hui (1990-1999), Chen Shui-bian 
                                                             
1 For convenience, I refer to Taiwan as either Taiwan or its official name, the Republic of 
China (ROC) in the study. In the same logic, China is regarded either as China, the 
Mainland, or the People‟s Republic of China (PRC). When I refer to both parties, I may 
use “nations” or “countries”, though Taiwan is not identified as such entity by the PRC. 
The government and people in Taiwan are referred to as Taiwanese, and where 
necessary a distinction is made between “native Taiwanese” and “mainlanders” who 
retreated to the island from the Mainland in 1949 with the KMT.  
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(2000-2007) and Ma Ying-jeou (2008-Present). To demonstrate, I will examine both 
factors within Taiwan and factors outside Taiwan. The rest of Chapter One provides a 
historical background to understand Taiwan‟s economy and its economic relation with 
China, followed by presenting the central puzzle of the thesis. It then offers some 
explanations in the literature and introduces my core argument and methodology used. It 
concludes with the structure of the entire thesis.  
 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF TAIWAN’S ECONOMY AND ITS 
CROSS-STRAIT ECONOMIC POLICY    
The Kuomintang (KMT or Nationalist Party) led by Chiang Kai-shek retreated to Taiwan 
after its defeat by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1949. After Chiang Kai-shek‟s 
death, his son Chiang Ching-kuo took over the control and fully concentrated on building 
on Taiwan‟s economy. In three decades since the 1960s, Taiwan achieved an economic 
breakthrough. Along with Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea, Taiwan has been 
known as one of Asia‟s “four little dragons”2. Classified as a developmental state, the 
state of Taiwan guided the market and prioritised the use of resources for key industries. 
With the guidance of its economic bureaucracies, its well-educated technocrats and an 
export-oriented economic policy, Taiwan was able to complete the industrial 
transformation in three decades that took Western nations a century (Vogel, 1991: 38). 
After its industrial advancement, Taiwan also loosened its tight political control and 
                                                             
2 Some scholars also refer them to “four little tigers”, but in this thesis I follow Ezra 
Vogel‟s term of “four little dragons”. See: E. F. Vogel 1991, The Four Little Dragons: The 
Spread of Industrialisation in East Asia, Harvard University Press: Cambridge.  
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responded to calls for democracy. In 1986, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) 
became the first opposition party officially recognised in Taiwan, and in 1987, martial law 
was lifted (Cheng and Lin, 1999: 236). The experience of the first direct Presidential 
election and the first cycle of party change in the 2000 Presidential election also 
furthered Taiwan‟s democratisation.  
 
While Taiwan achieved an industrial breakthrough, China also experienced its rapid 
economic development. Since the late 1970s, China has moved from a closed, centrally 
planned system to a more market-oriented one that has played a major global role (CIA, 
2012). The adoption of economic reform and „open-door policy‟ in 1978 under Deng 
Xiaoping‟s leadership marked the beginning of China‟s economic miracle. In ten years 
between 1985 and 1995, China has experienced an outstanding double-digit economic 
growth rate of 11.5% on average (World Bank, 2012b). In 2010, China not only became 
the biggest exporter in the world, but surpassed Japan to be the second largest Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) just after the United States (World Bank, 2012b) 
 
When Chiang Kai-shek was the President of Taiwan, contacts over the Strait were 
minimal. After his son Chiang Ching-kuo took over the Presidency, Taiwanese firms were 
officially prohibited from directly trading with or investing in the PRC as a result of his 
“three no‟s policy”3 in 1979 (Tanner, 2006: 38). However, when China started to develop 
its economy in the 1980s, the Taiwanese government saw new incentives and 
                                                             
3 “Three Nos policy” refers to “no contact, no negotiation and no compromise”.  
4 
 
opportunities across the Strait. Three years before Chiang‟s death, in 1985, indirect 
trade via Hong Kong and small-scale investment was allowed. Two years later, the travel 
restrictions were also eased (Tanner, 2006: 39).  
 
Since the 1990s, Taiwan‟s economic policymaking towards China has changed over 
three Taiwanese administrations. The Lee Teng-hui administration adopted a range of 
restrictive cross-Strait economic policies. Both of his “Go South” policy in 1993, which 
aimed at diverting business opportunities from China towards Southeast Asia, along with 
his well-known “No Haste, Be Patient” policy in 1996, attempted to restrict trade with and 
investments in Mainland (Leng, 2002: 262). After ten years of Lee‟s era, Chen Shui-bian 
from the DPP took over the Presidency. Although his “Active Opening, Effective 
Management” policy appeared to show a sign of liberalising cross-Strait commercial ties 
at first, Chen‟s government soon reverted the policies to protectionism (Kastner, 2006: 
260). Not until Ma Ying-jeou gained power in 2008 did Taiwan‟s conservative economic 
stance towards China came to an end. In the years following his election, trade and 
investment between two sides have grown at an unprecedented rate thanks to the 
signing of Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) (MAC, 2012a).  
 
So what we witness here is that Taiwan‟s cross-Strait economic policymaking varied 
from strong protectionism in Lee‟s administration, to Chen‟s initial liberal position but 
soon reverted back to restrictive measures, and then to a greater openness under the 
Ma government. Therefore, Taiwan‟s changing economic relationship with the Mainland 
5 
 
suggests an interesting puzzle to be explained.  
 
PRESENTING THE PUZZLE  
The question of Taiwan‟s changing cross-Strait economic policymaking is of great 
importance to scholars and policymakers in Taiwan and China because not only the 
relationship between has the two been largely economic-dominated, thus contributing to 
the understanding of an overall cross-Taiwan Strait relationship, but we can also explore 
what Taiwan has seen as its national interests, whether in more national terms or liberal 
terms. The central puzzle of the thesis is: why has there been a change in Taiwan‟s 
cross-Strait economic policymaking in three distinctive administrations since the 1990s? 
Why was Taiwan‟s economic relation towards China restrictive under the administrations 
of Lee and Chen, but officially liberalised in Ma‟s government? What were their 
motivations underpinning their policy choices? What accounts for Taiwan‟s changing 
cross-Strait economic policy in the past two decades? Is it because of the internal factors 
or external factors? The next section presents some available answers in the literature.  
 
AVAILABLE ANSWERS 
The literature on Taiwan-China relationship is abundant. Although a large body of 
coverage centres on military confrontation across the Strait, recently more literature has 
focused on the bilateral economic relations. There are three different levels of 
explanations: the state-, the societal- and the external environmental-level.  
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For the first level, there are two explanations that merit attention. First, several scholars 
(Fuller, 2008; Lai, 2011; Yu, 1999) have viewed the variation of Taiwan‟s national priority 
goals as triggers of its different economic relations with China over time. Secondly, other 
scholars (Chen, 2011; Wu, 2005) attributed this changing relation to the fluctuations 
within the stances in Taiwan‟s political parties. With regards to the civil society-level 
explanations, the arguments can be arranged into two groups. The first one is the role of 
Taiwanese business people (taishang) in the process of promoting closer economic ties 
across the Strait. The second is the emphasis on public opinion which has influenced the 
decision making of cross-Strait economic ties in Taiwan.  
 
The third level of explanation also highlights two important points of view. Many scholars 
(Keng and Schubert, 2010; Wu, 2005; Yu, 1999) highlighted the role of China‟s 
adjustment in its Taiwan policy from the Jiang Zemin administration to the Hu Jintao era. 
Other scholars (Wang, 2010) claimed a changing global and regional economic 
environment that has changed Taiwan‟s economic stance towards the Mainland. Apart 
from these preliminary suggestions the literature presents, this thesis seeks to examine 
Taiwan‟s changing cross-Strait economic policymaking in a consistent period of time by 
looking at three distinctive Taiwanese administrations since the 1990s. It intends to 
demonstrate the motivations underpinning different administration‟s policy choices by 
using mainly qualitative methodologies which were lacked in the literature.  
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ARGUMENT AND METHODOLOGY IN BRIEF 
The central argument of this thesis is that the external factor, China‟s rise in 
economic, diplomatic and military terms, accounts for Taiwan‟s changing 
cross-Strait economic policymaking in the last twenty years. In the eras of Lee 
Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian from 1990 to 2007, it is in the national interests of 
Taiwan to restrict cross-Strait economic exchanges whereas since Ma Ying-jeou‟s 
administration came to power in 2008, it seems more in the national interests to 
engage in more free trade with the Mainland. My analysis demonstrates that based 
on the assessment of China‟s power, different cross-Strait policies employed by 
different Taiwanese administrations actually serve the same nationalist purpose, 
which is to protect Taiwan‟s security and maintain its „sovereignty‟4.   
 
This study is primarily based on a comparative analysis of Taiwan‟s cross-Strait 
economic policies under three different Taiwanese administrations in the past two 
decades. To illustrate, the study specifically uses two International Political Economy 
(IPE) theories, economic nationalism and economic liberalism, as the theoretical 
accounts. The rationale behind the selection of these two theories is because the 
relationship between Taiwan and China is unique in the sense that the bilateral 
relationship is not a diplomatic level relation, but primarily an economic and commercial 
one. Therefore, these two competing economic theories provide a theoretical framework 
that fits the uniqueness of this case study. In order to illustrate, I will examine two sets of 
                                                             
4 Technically speaking, Taiwan does not have sovereignty because it is not recognised 
as a nation worldwide.    
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factors behind the changing economic relations: internal and external factors. For 
internal factors, I will examine both Taiwanese politics and the role of Taiwan‟s business 
society as it is an important proxy for Taiwan-China relations. For external factors, I will 
explore China‟s growth in economic, diplomatic and military aspects as well as the role of 
an important regional/global event in each period. To demonstrate, I will mostly utilise a 
qualitative method of discourse analysis, studying official statements and documents in 
Taiwan. I will also use some descriptive statistics to understand China‟s material growth.  
 
THE ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS  
The thesis will be divided into six chapters. Chapter Two lays the conceptual and 
analytical foundations for my thesis. It provides an examination of two IPE theories, 
economic nationalism and economic liberalism, as well as their relations with the study. 
Chapter Two also presents a detailed overview of Taiwan‟s political economy and its 
changing economic relations with China since the 1990s, followed by a literature review 
in why such change occurred. The chapter concludes by presenting the methodology 
used in this thesis.  
 
The next three chapters analyse Taiwan‟s economic relations with the Mainland under 
three different Taiwanese administrations, as well as examining why particular economic 
policies prevailed in each time period. In each of the analysis chapters, I am going to 
demonstrate nationalist interests in nationalist terms and liberal terms respectively. 
Chapter Three shows the restrictive economic policies towards China under the Lee 
9 
 
Teng-hui administration. Chapter Four reveals the initial liberal but later restrictive 
policies in Chen Shui-bian‟s era. Chapter Five demonstrates the liberal commercial 
policies promoted by the Ma Ying-jeou administration.  
 
Chapter Six, the conclusion to this study, draws comparisons of economic policymaking 
across all three different Taiwanese administrations. It also discusses why two economic 
theoretical approaches were taken in this study. It then presents the findings and 
implications for future research. The next chapter provides a beginning to the answer of 
the puzzle by understanding Taiwan‟s political economy.  
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Chapter Two                                                               
Understanding Taiwan’s Political Economy  
 
This chapter presents a detailed understanding of Taiwan‟s political economy. It starts 
with the theoretic framework for my thesis by introducing two IPE theories. It then shows 
an overview of Taiwan‟s political economy followed by Taiwan‟s changing economic 
relations with China since the 1990s. The chapter concludes by reviewing the literature 
deemed for a systematic analysis of this changing economic relation and presenting the 
methodology used in the thesis.  
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
Before discussing these two IPE theories, I want to briefly explain why I choose them for 
the thesis. The relationship between Taiwan and China is not conventional in the sense 
that there has not been a diplomatic relation between the two territories as Taiwan is not 
recognised as a nation both by the PRC and the world. Rather, the specific economic 
relation dominates most of the cross-Strait relations. Therefore, the below two competing 
IPE theories help understand the economic relations between Taiwan and China, as well 
as the motivations behind those economic choices.  
 
Economic Nationalism 
In conventional scholarly literature, economic nationalism was usually used to describe 
an economic variant of realism (Helleiner, 2002: 309). The core of this concept, as Gilpin 
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(1987: 31) argued, “is that economic activities are and should be subordinated to the 
goal of state building and the interests of the state. All nationalists ascribe to the primacy 
of the state, of national security, and of military power in the organisation and functioning 
of the international system”. Scholars, such as Friedrich List, often claim that economic 
nationalists are hostile to free trade, foreign investment and close economic ties with 
other nations (Shulman, 2000: 365). As Harlen (1999: 733) argued that usually economic 
nationalists employ the term synonymously with mercantilism or protectionism to refer to 
the use of state intervention in international free market exchange.  
 
He also pointed out that in its more benign form, economic nationalism attempts to 
protect the economy against external economic and political forces. Such defensive 
economic nationalists pursue protectionist and related policies to protect their infant or 
declining industries and to safeguard domestic interests because economic nationalists 
are concerned that the political position of the state will be weakened as a consequence 
of an increasing economic integration with another state (Krasner, 1976: 320). In other 
words, from the perspective of economic nationalists, closer economic ties would 
establish dependency among trading partners, and one party may use economic 
coercion to exploit the adversary‟s vulnerabilities and influence its behaviour regarding 
security issues.  
 
Later, a revised version of economic nationalism was proposed by a number of scholars 
(Abdelal, 2001; Harlen, 1999; Helleiner, 2002; Shulman, 2000). They argued that the 
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ideological content of the nationalism has been neglected, and the economic nationalism 
should be properly defined as “a set of policies that result from a shared national identity, 
or from the predominance of a specific nationalism in the politics of a state” (Abdelal, 
2001: 33). Therefore, by placing nationalism at the core of the definition, as Helleiner 
(2002: 308) argued, economic nationalism can be associated with a wide range of policy 
projects, including the endorsement of liberal economic policies.  
 
This is because wealth is also a crucial factor for state power in international relations, 
and an economically strong state is more able to advance its national interests in the 
face of foreign competition and threats than an economically weak one (Shulman, 2000: 
369). Nationalist goals such as the promoting of the unity, identity and autonomy of a 
nation can be pursued through a variety of economic policies that include free trade 
(Shulman, 2000: 369). For this reason, economic globalisation has not eliminated 
economic nationalism as an ideology, but rather changed the techniques that nationalists 
use to achieve the same ends of bolstering power, prestige, or the prosperity of the 
nation (Shulman, 2000: 369). The adoption of free trade thus was seen by nationalists as 
one of the economic tools to bolster national power (Helleiner, 2002: 322). Those 
nationalists are therefore known as liberal economic nationalists.  
 
As we have seen, the policy content of economic nationalism was diverse with some 
economic nationalists challenging liberal economic policies, while other supported and 
reinforced such policies (Helleiner, 2002: 323). For conventional economic nationalists, 
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protectionism was just one method of strengthening the industrial capacity and security 
of a nation (Harlen, 1999: 742). For liberal economic nationalists, nationalist goals can 
be advanced by liberal economic policies (Shulman, 2000: 373).  
 
Economic Liberalism 
The liberal perspective on political economy is committed to free trade and open markets 
as the most efficacious means for organising domestic and international economic 
relations and promoting economic growth and individual welfare (Gilpin, 1987: 27). 
Wealth-creating, the first aspect of free trade, played a crucial role in the thought of the 
early economic liberals including Adam Smith, David Ricardo and John Mill. As Smith 
argued, free trade policies helped to increase national wealth by making possible a 
greater specialisation of labour and thereby increasing production (Harlen, 1999: 735). 
Building upon Smith‟s philosophy, Ricardo placed emphasis on comparative advantage 
of a nation in order to gain the most from foreign trade (Crane, 1997: 56). Like Smith and 
Ricardo, Mill generally opposed government interference in free market because it 
worked against the general good by preventing the most beneficial utilisation of 
resources (Harlen, 1999: 735).  
 
On the second aspect of economic liberalism, trade and economic exchange are a 
source of peaceful relations among nations since the mutual benefits of trade and 
expanding interdependence among national economies will tend to foster cooperative 
relations (Gilpin, 1987: 31). As Mill (1848: 120) argued, international trade is the principal 
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guarantee of the peace of the world. By creating common interests, the states become 
interdependent with each other, thus the anticipation that war will disrupt trade and result 
in a loss of the gains from trade deters political leaders from war against key trading 
partners (Levy, 1998: 149; Oneal and Russett, 1997: 268). In contrast to nationalists‟ 
concern that free trade would be likely to create dependence and result in loss of 
national power, liberalists argue that it would create interdependence among trading 
partners which brings peace.  
 
After presenting a broad theoretical background by discussing two competing economic 
theories, the next section specifically focuses on Taiwan‟s political economy, which 
follows the East Asian developmental state model.  
 
TAIWAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY  
In East Asia, the dragon has long been considered a symbol of power. Since the 1960s, 
Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore, known as “the four little dragons”, 
achieved rapid industrial transformations and excellent economic development. Along 
with the Europe Union (EU) and the North American Free Trade Zone, these four East 
Asian societies plus Japan have constituted one of the triads of the modern industrial 
world in three decades after the Second World War (Vogel, 1991: 1).  
 
Unlike the conventional model of liberal free-market capitalism, these East Asian 
economies provided an alternative framework for effective governance and economic 
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development, which was coined as “the developmental state” (DS) model by Chalmers 
Johnson in 1982 (Johnson, 1982). As a distinctive political economy, the DS combines 
elements of market and plan, linking a mixed economy to a political-ideological approach 
that combines authoritarian technocracy with a relatively egalitarian distribution of 
income and wealth (Radice, 2008: 1154). Using incentives, controls and mechanisms to 
spread risk, the governments guided or governed market processes of resource 
allocation so as to produce different production and investment outcomes than would 
have occurred with purely free markets (Wade, 2004: 26).  
 
As a classical East Asian developmental state, Taiwan was the first little dragon to 
achieve an industrial breakthrough. But when the KMT retreated to Taiwan in 1949, the 
economic prospect had been dim. Its average gross national product (GNP) per capita 
was below $100, which was about the same as that of India (Vogel, 1991: 13). However, 
between 1953 and 1986, Taiwan‟s GNP grew at an unprecedented rate of 8.8% and per 
capita GNP at 6.2% (Wade, 2004: 38). Until 1986, Taiwan achieved an average income 
of $3,600 which pushed up its world rank to 38 (Wade, 2004: 38). Using Johnson‟s (1987) 
DS criteria, we can attribute Taiwan‟s successful industrialisation to several important 
factors as shown in Table 2.1. This section will discuss the top three most important ones: 
Taiwan‟s state autonomy, two pilot economic bureaucracies, and its foreign trade 
policies.  
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Table 2.1: East Asian Developmental State Attributes 
East Asian Developmental State 
Attributes 
Attributes in Taiwan Specifically 
High state autonomy KMT‟s firm control over economic development 
in Taiwan  
Pilot economic bureaucracies  Economic Planning and Development (CEPD) 
Industrial Development Bureau of the Ministry 
of Economic Affairs (IDB) 
Foreign trade policy  Import substitution policy 
Export-driven economic policy  
Well developed human resources Well-educated and highly skilled technocrats 
such as K.Y.Yin, the then director of the 
Chinese Foreign Trade Office in New York, and 
K.T. Li, the then Finance Minister 
Enterprise Dominated by small- to medium-sized family 
ownership  
External factors The U.S. offered technical advice and 
economic assistance throughout the Cold War 
The importance of the group Traditional Confucian philosophy of groups 
over individuals  
Education  Emphasis on education, selecting elites 
through competitive college entrance exams 
Source: Johnson C. (1982). MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of the Industrial 
Policy, 1925-1975, Stanford University Press: Stanford and Wade, R. (2004). Governing 
the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization, 
Princeton University Press: Princeton. 
 
The Autonomy of the State 
As the KMT established an authoritarian rule in Taiwan, political leaders were able to 
develop national goals independently (Wu, 2007: 980). Learning from its bitter 
experience in the Mainland, the formation of new political parties was banned and the 
intermediate organisations were also carefully scrutinised by the KMT so as to make 
sure that no genuine opposition to the party existed (Wu, 2007: 980). The sense of threat 
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from the Mainland also helped to justify KMT‟s tight control over the island. Therefore, 
Taiwan‟s authoritarian political arrangement provided the basis for market guidance and 
enabled the state to have firm control over economic development (Wade, 2004: 27).  
 
Taiwan‟s high degree of party state autonomy and political stability also gave 
modernising bureaucrats more room to manoeuvre in promoting industrialisation and 
capitalists with more confidence in the security of their investment in Taiwan‟s industry 
(Vogel, 1991: 18). The highly centralised government enabled the state to exert strong 
leadership in guiding the market by setting rules and influencing decision-making in the 
private sectors, prioritising the use of resources for industries important for future growth 
and military strength as well as maintaining control over the flows of financial capital 
(Vogel, 1991:110). This combination of private markets and public intervention has been 
a significant factor in Taiwan‟s economic success (Vogel, 1991: 5).  
 
The Economic Bureaucracy 
Governing the market also requires a small number of powerful policymaking agencies 
to be able to maintain the priorities expressed in the routine accumulation of particular 
negotiations and policies in line with a notion of the national interest (Wade, 2004: 195). 
While the politicians set broad goals and protect the technocrats from political pressure, 
the official bureaucracies perform think tank functions, chart the route for economic 
development, decide which industries to be prioritised, obtain a consensus for its plans 
from the private sector, act as gate-keeper for contacts with the international market, and 
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provide positive government support for private economic initiative (Wade, 2004: 195).  
 
In Johnson‟s account of DS (1982), Ministry of International Trade and Investment (MITI), 
Japan‟s central economic bureaucracy, is one of the core features that accounts for 
Japan‟s economic achievement. In the case of Taiwan, the most important agencies for 
industrial planning were the Council for Economic Planning and Development (CEPD) 
and the Industrial Development Bureau of the Ministry of Economic Affairs (IDB) (Wade, 
2004: 195). As the advisory body to the cabinet with the most economists, the CEPD 
covers the formulation of the macroeconomic development plans, analyses the current 
situation of the economy, and evaluates large-scale public enterprise projects (Wade, 
2004: 197). The IDB then turns the CEPD‟s broad guidance plan into detailed sectoral 
working plans, grades the production facilities of firms in key industries and oversees the 
interaction between domestic suppliers and foreign companies (Wade, 2004: 202). 
Therefore, the economic bureaucracies in Taiwan played a crucial role in helping firms to 
acquire technology, allocating funds for key projects and guiding the entire development 
of the economy (Wade, 2004: 27).  
 
Management of Foreign Trade 
In addition, management of foreign trade policies is crucial to Taiwan‟s economy. Its most 
prominent import policy, the import substitution policy, was designed to produce locally 
goods formerly imported and make Taiwan a more self-sufficient economy. When Taiwan 
just started to concentrate on manufacturing basic consumer goods, its local industry 
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was threatened by the massive flow of cheap manufactured goods from Japan (Vogel, 
1991: 15). Therefore since 1949, the KMT started to protect Taiwan‟s infant industries 
from the flood of cheap Japanese products by setting up import restrictions not only for 
economic gains, but for national interests concerns (Vogel, 1991: 15). Throughout the 
1950s, the policy contributed as much as one-third to the growth of manufactured output 
(Wade, 2004: 84).  
 
Since the early 1960s, export expansion has instead constituted the major source of 
economic growth in Taiwan. The government intervened in trade in order to promote 
prioritised sectors and obtain foreign exchange (Wade, 2004: 113). As the international 
market remained relatively open after the World War Two, plenty of opportunities were 
available for Taiwanese exporters (Wade, 2004: 113). Taking advantage of its own cheap 
labour, Taiwan exported labour-intensive goods at the early stage of the economic 
development, and later gradually shifted to capital- and knowledge-intensive products as 
its labour costs rose (Wu, 2007: 981).  
 
In short, Taiwan, a classical example of the developmental state model, has put together 
the political economy of capitalism in ways unprecedented in the Anglo-American West 
and achieved high success in its economic growth. Apart from its economic achievement, 
Taiwan also advanced greatly in democratisation since the 1980s. The DPP was officially 
recognised as Taiwan‟s first opposition party in 1986, and the martial law was lifted in 
1987 (Cheng and Lin, 1999: 236). Taiwan experienced its first direct Presidential election 
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in 1996 and witnessed the first cycle of party change in the 2000 Presidential election. 
Taiwan‟s civil society also evolved from a divided and weak society to a more vibrant one 
(Rigger, 1999: 2). At the same time of Taiwan‟s social changes, the rise of China became 
the phenomenon of the world that Taiwan could no longer ignore. The economic bilateral 
relationship between the two, however, has changed over time. The next section will 
provide an overall picture of this variation.  
 
TAIWAN’S ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH CHINA 
When the KMT retreated to Taiwan in 1949, cross-Strait economic development came to 
an abrupt stop. Since the 1960s, Taiwan experienced a breakthrough in its economic 
development. Two decades later, the PRC also underwent rapid economic growth. Since 
then, huge trade and investment flows have emerged with the restoration of cross-Strait 
commercial activities. In 1985, indirect exports channelled through Hong Kong were 
legalised and unofficial Taiwanese tolerance of small-scale investments was allowed 
(Tanner, 2006: 39). In 1987, Taiwan even permitted Taiwanese to visit the mainland for 
the first time since the end of the civil war (Tanner, 2006: 39). However, Taiwan‟s 
economic policymaking towards the PRC has changed since the 1990s. Cross-Strait 
economic policies transformed from aggressive nationalism in Lee Teng-hui‟s 
administration, to initial liberal but later nationalist approaches in Chen Shui‟bian‟s era, 
and then to official liberalisation under Ma Ying-jeou‟s leadership. Below presents an 
overview of different cross-Strait economic policies under three distinctive Taiwanese 
administrations.  
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Taiwan’s Economic Policy towards China under Lee Teng-hui’s Government 
(1990-1999) 
After the death of Chiang Ching-kuo in 1988, the fierce power struggle within the KMT 
ended up with the victory of Lee Teng-hui. Under his leadership, Taiwanese authority 
adopted strong protectionism policies towards the Mainland and was reluctant to 
liberalise cross-Strait economic relations (Tanner, 2006: 47). In the early 1990s, Taiwan‟s 
government started to implement new regulations on cross-Strait economic exchanges 
aimed at strengthening the government‟s ability to monitor and control mainland 
investments (Leng, 2002: 262). In 1993, the Investment Commission of Ministry of 
Economic Affairs not only required that all investments over $1 million must be prior 
approved by the government and subject to a rigorous review process, but prohibited 
investments in certain valued industries such as strategic, defense-related and high-tech 
sectors (Chu, 1997: 239).  
 
In the same year, Lee‟s government also introduced the “Go South” policy which aimed 
at diverting Taiwanese investment away from China to Southeast Asia (Tanner, 2006: 45). 
Cross-Strait trade and investment were further tightened and controlled after Lee 
becoming the first-ever-elected President in 1996. The government promulgated the „No 
Haste, Be Patient‟ policy immediately after the election (Tanner, 2006: 46). The policy 
imposed a new ceiling of $50 million on individual Taiwanese investment in the Mainland 
(Ho and Leng, 2004: 734). The government followed up in 1997 with a ban on Taiwanese 
investment in most large-scale infrastructure and energy projects on the mainland 
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(Tanner, 2006: 48). It also enforced a maximum investment level of 20% to 40% of a 
firm‟s total net worth (Tanner, 2006: 48). “Three direct links”5 were still prohibited, which 
means that most cross-Strait trade has been shipping indirectly either through Hong 
Kong or third-country posts (Tanner, 2006: 48).  
 
In spite of the restrictive official cross-Strait economic policies, Taiwanese businessmen 
found ways to bypass governmental restrictions (Lee, 2003: 118). Much of Taiwan‟s 
investment went to China via the Caribbean region, especially through Virgin Islands 
(Lee, 2003: 118). A glimpse of Taiwan‟s indirect investment in China shows that trade 
increased 5-fold from $5 billion to $25 billion during Lee‟s ten-year-presidency (MAC, 
2002b).  
 
Taiwan’s Economic Policy towards China under Chen Shui-bian’s 
Government (2000-2007) 
When Chen Shui-bian, the leader of the opposition party DPP, was elected as the 
President in 2000, his government initially eased the restrictions on trade and investment 
with the Mainland. The Chen administration formed a new Economic Development 
Advisory Council (EDAC) in 2001 and agreed on many economic recommendations, 
such as the liberalisation of direct trade and investment, the creation of more flexible 
cross-Strait capital flow mechanisms, and the opening of travel and tourism (Sutter, 2002: 
532). Later that year, the new administration replaced Lee‟s restrictive “Go Slow, Be 
                                                             
5 Three direct links are: direct trade, transportation and communication. 
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Patient” policy with “Active Opening, Effective Management” policy, which aimed at 
actively promoting economic ties across the Strait (Tanner, 2006: 53). The $50 million 
investment cap was eliminated and the bar requiring investment approval was reduced 
to $20 million (Fuller, 2008: 242).  
 
However, these seemingly relaxed measures were soon reverted back to strong 
nationalist approaches by the DPP administration. The slow pace of liberalisation in 
investment regulations continued to disappoint the Taiwanese entrepreneurs and the 
“three direct links” were still prohibited (Kastner, 2006: 260). In a report on the likely 
impact of direct transportation links produced by the Executive Yuan 2003, the authority 
emphasised a daunting list of specific national security obstacles that would have to be 
overcome before the direct links could be established (Tanner, 2006: 65). Many DPP 
officials argued that the overall effect of the “three direct links” could be negative 
because a transfer of Taiwan‟s talent, resources and capital to China would marginalise 
Taiwan‟s economy in the world (Roy, 2004: 4). In 2006, two years after Chen got 
re-elected, he announced a change in cross-Strait economic policy by shuffling the 
words of his previous one (Fuller, 2008: 244). The new policy, “Effective Opening, Active 
Management”, promised a tightening up of supervision on Taiwanese investment across 
the Strait (MAC, 2006b). Similar to the previous Lee administration‟s situation, despite 
official restrictions on cross-Strait economic exchanges, the actual figure of trade 
quadrupled from $28 billion to $124 billion during Chen‟s Presidency (MAC, 2008d).  
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Taiwan’s Economic Policy towards China under Ma Ying-jeou’s Government 
(2008- Present) 
The cross-Strait commercial relationship on the official basis has improved greatly since 
Ma Ying-jeou, the KMT candidate, won the 2008 Presidential election in 2008. Unlike his 
predecessors, Ma has advocated a liberal idea of cross-Strait economic relationship. 
During the first two years of Ma‟s Presidency, the semi-official organisations of two sides: 
the Association of Relationship Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) as representative of 
Beijing, and the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) as representative of Taipei, held four 
rounds of dialogues and consultations, and reached twelve agreements, including the 
direct air and shipping services that have been a long-time conundrum across the Strait 
(Chen, 2011: 154).  
 
In June 2010, Taiwan and China moved a further step in liberalising the economic 
relations. After five months of consultations and negotiations, in the fifth round of 
ARATS-SEF dialogue, the “Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement” (ECFA) was 
signed. It is an open, comprehensive, gradually advancing and cooperative agreement 
which aimed at facilitating and regulating economic exchanges between Taiwan and 
China (Chen, 2011: 154). Regarded as a milestone in the cross-Strait relations because 
the economic ties of the two sides were officially liberalised, the ECFA aimed at reducing 
tariffs, liberalising investment and trade, and establishing dispute resolution mechanisms 
(Wang, 2010: 257). Wang continued to point out that the new administration argued that 
the signing of ECFA would not only help Taiwanese companies develop Chinese markets, 
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but promote the internationalisation of Taiwan‟s economy and avoid marginalisation in 
the Asia economic regionalism process. In only three years since Ma came to power, 
cross-Strait trade increased 1.3 times from $129 billion to $160 billion (MAC, 2012b). In 
fact, the pursuit of closer economic ties with China not only benefited Taiwanese 
businessmen, but helped Ma solidify his support in the island and his re-election as the 
President in 2012.  
 
As we can see from the above three periods, Taiwan has changed its official cross-Strait 
economic policy over time, however, the economic integration with the Mainland has 
grown regardless of what policies were imposed. The interesting question thus becomes 
why has there been a change and what motivated the change of Taiwan‟s official 
economic policy stance on China? The next section reviews what has been discussed in 
the literature with respect to the question. 
 
EXISTING EXPLANATIONS FOR TAIWAN’S CHANGING 
CROSS-STRAIT ECONOMIC POLICYMAKING 
Recent literature on Taiwan-China relations focuses more on their economic and 
commercial relations rather than conventional security issues. By and large, the 
literature on cross-Strait economic variation has been dominated by case- and 
period-specific explanations while neglecting the long consistent process of historical 
development of this bilateral relationship. Nevertheless, they offer some preliminary 
suggestions as to why Taiwan‟s cross-Strait economic policymaking has evolved. The 
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explanations can be organised into three levels: the state-, the societal- and the external 
environmental-level.  
 
State-level Explanations  
Two main state-level explanations for Taiwan‟s economic variation towards the PRC 
merit attention. First, several scholars (Fuller, 2008; Lai, 2011; Yu, 1999) viewed the 
variation of Taiwan‟s national priority goals as triggers of its different economic relations 
with China over time. As Yu (1999: 48) argued, Taiwan has not abandoned its position 
that national security should take precedence over particularistic business interests at 
the end of the 1990s. He also pointed out that its pragmatic diplomacy to win 
international recognition for Taiwan as a sovereign state also remained a top national 
priority at the expense of a stable relationship with China during Chen‟s Presidency. 
However, the signing of ECFA between Taiwan and China reflected a shift of national 
goals to normalise cross-Strait commercial relations and prevent Taiwanese economy 
from being marginalised in the region (Lai, 2010: 175).   
 
Secondly, other scholars (Chen, 2011; Wu, 2005) attributed this changing policymaking 
to the fluctuations in the stances of Taiwan‟s political parties. As Wu (2005: 42) noted, 
with the inauguration of Lee Teng-hui as President, the KMT started to digress from its 
time-honoured commitment of the “One China-principle” while remaining highly 
suspicious of any economic links with China, as typified in the 1996 economic policy of 
“Patience over Haste”. It was not until when Ma Ying-jeou came to power in 2008, that 
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the KMT returned to its previous “One China, Different interpretations”6 principle and 
actively pursued increasing economic integration (Chen, 2011: 154). Similar to the KMT, 
the DPP also changed its position on economic relations with China. At the start of Chen 
Shui-bian‟s Presidency, the DPP showed a willingness to engage with the Mainland, 
however, it soon changed back to its traditional pro-independence position by promoting 
strong national sentiment in Taiwan and suggesting that pro-engagement economic 
policies with China would hollow out Taiwan‟s economy (Wu, 2005: 49).  
 
Civil Society-level Explanations  
Civil society-level explanations can be arranged into two groups. First, the role of 
Taiwanese business people (taishang) is worth noting because Taiwan does not have a 
diplomatic relation with the Mainland, thus taishang acting as quasi-diplomats in the 
process of cross-Strait economic engagement. As Keng and Schubert (2010) pointed out, 
despite the Taiwanese business community‟s consistent demand of a greater openness 
towards the Mainland, their business interests were asked to give way to Taiwan‟s 
national security by the Lee and Chen administrations. They also argued that afterwards, 
taishang increasingly acted as “linkage communities” across the Strait, and both small- 
and big-sized enterprises lobbied together in promoting greater economic exchanges. 
The lobby was ultimately successful when Ma came to power and officially liberalised 
                                                             
6 “One China, Different Interpretations”, also known as “1992 Consensus”, was agreed 
by the ARATS and SEF in 1992. The consensus is that both sides agreed that there is 
only one China. However, the two sides have different interpretations as to the meaning 
of one China. To Beijing, one China means the PRC whereas to Taipei, it means the 
ROC. See: Xinhua Net, 2006, 1992 Consensus, [Available at] 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/tw/2006-04/05/content_4385932.htm.  
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cross-Strait commercial activities.  
 
The second type of civil society-level explanation emphasises the role of public opinion. 
Given that Taiwan is a democracy, many scholars (Hsieh and Niou, 2005; Huang, 2005; 
Keng, Chen and Huang, 2006; Tsai, Wang and Tossutti, 2008) consider the public 
opinion as one that has affected the political leaders‟ decisions to deal with cross-Strait 
trade and investment. As the traditional one-dimensional method with preference for 
unification and independence at the extremes and the preservation of the status-quo 
representing the centrist position is insufficient to study the attitudes of Taiwanese on the 
independence-unification issue, Niou (2005) disaggregated the pro-status quo majority 
by examining how individuals might be persuaded economically to abandon their original 
stance. Similarly, Keng et al (2006) also explored how these two different sources of 
motivation of public attitudes, rational economic interests and affective identity, 
combined to influence the structure of Taiwan-China relations.  
 
External Environment Explanations  
Many scholars (Keng and Schubert, 2010; Wu, 2005) highlighted the role of China‟s 
adjustment in its Taiwan policy from the Jiang Zemin administration to the Hu Jintao 
era. In earlier years, as argued by Keng and Schubert (2010), Jiang followed a 
policy of harsh “verbal attacks and military threats” while later emphasising on “great 
power relations” as a response to the trend towards separatism in Taiwan. They also 
noted that contrary to his predecessor, Hu‟s Taiwan policy, on one hand, targeted at 
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reducing military threats to minimise Taiwanese resentment while at the same time 
strengthening economic interdependence in the Strait and attempting to influence 
the Taiwanese public opinion.  
 
Besides, Wang (2010) argued that a changing global economic environment and 
regional economic integration also pushed the Taiwanese government into 
repositioning its economic relations with the Mainland. She particularly pointed out 
that the 2008 Global Financial Crisis and the rise of regional trade agreements such 
as “ASEAN+1”7 and “ASEAN+3”8 placed Taiwan in danger of being marginalised in 
the world‟s economies, thus making Taiwan to reposition its economy, particularly in 
its economic relations with China, in order to strengthen its own competitive 
advantage.  
 
All of the three different levels of explanations are relevant to the analysis of Taiwan‟s 
changing cross-Strait economic policy. The first one explains how the upper level of 
national priority and political party position variations affect the Taiwan-China economic 
relations, the second one reveals how the bottom-down societal forces push the change, 
and the third one argues the importance of external environment in influencing the policy 
decisions.  
 
 
                                                             
7 „ASEAN+1” refers to “ASEAN+China”. 
8 ASEAN+3” refers to “ASEAN+China+Japan+South Korea”.  
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CASE SELECTION AND METHODOLOGY 
As shown above, the state-, the societal- and the external environment-level 
explanations all contribute to the understanding of Taiwan‟s changing economic relation 
with China. However, some deficiencies existed in the literature. For the state-level 
explanations, the government‟s motivations behind the economic policies were 
oversimplified. For societal-level accounts, how Taiwanese government responded to 
the business community‟s demand was neglected. For the external environmental 
factors, the change was examined only in critical periods of time such as missile crisis 
and the global financial crisis, rather than throughout a consistent long period of time. 
The methodology used in the literature was also dominated by quantitative methods. 
Qualitative methodologies were not widely used.  
 
In the light of these deficiencies, this study takes the form of a comparative analysis into 
Taiwan‟s cross-Strait economic policy under three different Taiwanese administrations 
since the 1990s: Lee Teng-hui (1990-2000), Chen Shui-bian (2000-2008) and Ma 
Ying-jeou (2008-Present). Since Taiwan‟s relationship with China is not on a diplomatic 
level, but mostly dominated by commerce, the introduction of the two International 
Political Economy (IPE) theories, economic nationalism and economic liberalism, 
provide a theoretical framework to understand this changing relationship and the 
motivations behind the policy choices. Two sets of factors, the internal factors and the 
external factors, will be assessed during each period of time. For the internal factors, I 
will explore both Taiwanese domestic politics and the role of its business community. For 
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the external factors, I will look at both the rise of China in all terms, economic, diplomatic 
and military as well as an important global event under each administration.  
 
To demonstrate, this thesis is primarily dominated by qualitative methodologies of 
discourse analyses. The primary sources of qualitative methods include sources from 
Taiwanese government such as official statements and Presidential addresses, as well 
as sources from Chinese government such as the PRC White Papers and from the U.S. 
government such as Department of Defense annual reports to Congress. The study also 
uses descriptive data derived from reliable organisations such as ROC Mainland Affairs 
Council (MAC), World Bank and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Along with the 
primary sources, the study has also involved a range of secondary sources of a 
predominantly qualitative nature. These include: Taiwanese, Chinese and the world‟s 
economic, political, historical and social science-based analyses of each Taiwanese 
administration.  
 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has provided a theoretic account of the thesis by introducing two competing 
IPE theories, economic nationalism and economic liberalism. It then narrowed down the 
focus to Taiwan‟s political economy and traced the history of its changing relationship 
with the Mainland since the 1990s. Given the central questions of the thesis, the chapter 
has also discussed preliminary answers in the related literature, pointed out the gap and 
introduced the methodology accordingly.  
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Over the following three chapters, I will examine Taiwan‟s economic policymaking 
towards China under the respective Lee, Chen and Ma administrations. For each, I will 
investigate what factors overrides Taiwan‟s commercial relations with China. These 
involve two internal factors, Taiwan‟s domestic politics and the role of its business group. 
These also include two external factors, China‟s rising power in economic, diplomatic 
and military aspects and a significant regional/global event in each period.   
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Chapter Three                                                               
Taiwan’s Cross-Strait Economic Policy under the Lee 
Teng-hui Administration (1990-1999) 
 
The previous chapter has shown an overall picture of Taiwan‟s political economy and the 
history of its economic relation with the Mainland. It also has provided the theoretical 
foundation and methodology for the analyses. As the start of the analyses, this chapter 
focuses on Taiwan‟s economic policymaking under the Lee Teng-hui administration. 
Under Lee‟s leadership, the KMT government adopted strong protectionism policies to 
slow down and resist the intensified economic exchanges with China throughout the 
1990s. In 1993, he put forward the “Go South” strategy, which aimed at diversifying 
Taiwanese investment and diverting it away from the Mainland to Southeast Asia (Tanner, 
2006: 45). In 1996, Lee‟s government promulgated “No Haste, Be Patient” policy, which 
further tightened the administrative oversights and controls of Taiwanese investment into 
the Mainland (Tanner, 2006: 47).  
 
In this chapter, I will explain why Lee‟s administration adopted a conservative stance in 
cross-Strait economic policymaking and show how national security was defined in 
economic terms. On the one hand, I will examine two internal factors, Taiwan‟s domestic 
politics and the role of its business society. On the other hand, I will study two external 
factors, the rise of China and a regional/global event, which is in this period of time, 
namely the 1998 Asian Financial Crisis. To demonstrate, I will use a combination of 
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discourse analysis and economic statistics.  
 
INTERNAL FACTORS  
Taiwan’s Domestic Politics  
In the first four years (1988-1992) after the passing of Chiang Ching-kuo, the power 
struggle within the ruling party was intensified. In the end, Lee Teng-hui steadily 
consolidated his power and successfully gained the control over the pace of cross-Strait 
economic exchange and recentralising the decision-making power (Chu, 1997: 237). In 
order to coordinate cross-Strait relations, Lee‟s government created two important 
organisations. In 1991, the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), a cabinet-level 
administrative agency was created (MAC, 2012d). Later that year, a semi-official 
organisation, the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF), was then created by the MAC with 
the responsibility in conducting cross-Strait political talks and negotiations (SEF, 2012).  
 
In Lee‟s era, social attitudes on the pace of cross-Strait exchange to be “just right” 
tended to decline over the time. As Figure 3.1 indicates, the proportion of respondents 
who believed that the pace was “just right” tended to decrease 20% from 1996 to 1998. 
However, Lee‟s administration did not follow the trend of the public opinion, but insisted 
on promoting his “No Haste, Be Patient” policy in 1996, which aimed at tightening the 
supervision of Taiwanese investment in China (Tanner, 2006: 45). As such, public 
opinion did not account for Lee government‟s economic stance towards China. The 
following will examine an internal factor other than public opinion, which is Taiwan‟s 
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politics through official statements under Lee‟s administration and secondary sources.  
 
Figure 3.1: The Pace of Cross-Strait Exchanges (1996-2000)  
 
Source: Mainland Affairs Council, ROC,  
http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/MMO/MAC/8906e_6.gif. 
 
After Lee consolidated his power within the KMT, the political contest over the steering 
wheel of the economic policy making towards the Mainland focused on two concerns: 
economic security and national security (Chu, 1997: 232). Table 3.1 below indicates 
three government statements used in this section. All of them demonstrate the economic 
security concern that worried the Lee administration. 
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Table 3.1: Taiwan’s Official Government Statements (1990-1999) 
Source: Mainland Affairs Council, ROC, http://www.mac.gov.tw/mp.asp?mp=3. 
 
As shown in an official document titled “Relations across the Taiwan Strait” produced by 
the Mainland Affairs Council in 1994, the administration particularly emphasised the 
importance of reciprocity, which is one of the principles underlying Taiwan‟s policy 
towards China (MAC, 1994). It stressed that “exchanges between the two sides of 
Taiwan Strait should serve the interests of both parties; relations should always be 
„win-win‟ rather than „zero sum‟”. It also stated that “although the Peking authorities claim 
that no one is trying to „swallow up‟ anyone else, they have actually adopted a tactic of 
„the strong devouring the weak‟ and they hold that economic exchanges should be 
elevated to a strategic level so as to „tie up Taiwan‟”. It is apparent that Lee‟s government 
was concerned of Taiwan‟s national interests defined in economic terms.  
 
As Leng (2002: 262) argued, in Lee‟s administration, this „hollowing out‟ effect was seen 
as the loss of manufacturing production, job opportunities and industrial competitiveness. 
Soon it turned out that their worries were not confined to labour-intensive industries. At 
the start of the 1990s, Taiwan‟s investment in China remained primarily in industries that 
required high use of labour and low levels of technological sophistication in production 
(Lee, 2003: 119). However, from the mid-1990s onwards, Taiwanese investment shifted 
 
Occasion of the Speech 
 
Date 
 
Organisation 
Relations across the Taiwan Strait 29th July 1994  
 
MAC 
Address to the11th Meeting of the 
National Reunification Committee 
 
1996 
Guidelines for National Unification  29th June 1997 
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to capital-intensive sectors and higher levels of technological sophistication, which 
raised the government‟s concern in those sectors (Lee, 2003: 119).  
 
In his keynote speech to the 11th Meeting of the National Reunification Committee in 
1996, Lee urged the business community to adopt his “No Haste, Be Patient” policy and 
stated, “(we need) to ensure the security and welfare of the 21million fellowmen in 
Taiwan…therefore the starting point of our Mainland policy must be to keep our roots in 
Taiwan” (MAC, 1996). As the security and welfare of Taiwanese are dependent on 
Taiwan‟s economic development, the roots Lee particularly referred to were Taiwan‟s 
economic root. One year later, in the Guidelines for National Unification produced in 
1997, the government emphasised the significance of economic security that 
“development of investment and trade relations with the Chinese mainland should 
involve exceptional consideration of political risks” (MAC, 1997).  
 
It can be seen that Lee‟s restrictive economic policies towards China were motivated by 
the nationalist concern of Taiwan‟s economic security. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, conventional economic nationalists ascribe to the primacy of national security 
(Gilpin, 1987: 31). From the Lee government‟s nationalist point of view, the acceleration 
of cross-Strait economic exchange was deemed detrimental since it would aggravate 
Taiwan‟s economic vulnerability and jeopardise Taiwan‟s national security. In fact, the 
Taiwanese government‟s concern was not just based on its speculation. In Taiwan, 
Beijing‟s cross-Strait economic policy was seen as „to peddle the domestic politics 
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through business and to influence the Taiwanese government through the people‟ (Chu, 
1997: 249). In one of China‟s three White Papers related to Taiwan, it stated that „active 
economic cooperation and other exchanges (are carried out)…in order to pave the way 
for the peaceful reunification of the country‟ (The Central Government of the PRC, 1993). 
In order to protect its economic national security, therefore, the Lee government adopted 
strong nationalist policies in the conduct of cross-Strait relations. The next section 
examines the role of Taiwan‟s business society in Lee‟s era.  
 
Taiwan’s Business Society  
Taiwan‟s domestic politics is not the sole internal factor in cross-Strait economic relations. 
The role of Taiwanese business society is also worth nothing because Taiwan does not 
have a diplomatic relation with the Mainland, thus making Taiwanese business people 
act as Taiwan‟s quasi-diplomats in dealing with cross-Strait relations. Since 1993, small- 
and medium-sized Taiwanese enterprises flocked to a greatly improved investment 
environment in China, and they were quickly followed by large business groups from 
1993 (Chu, 1997: 242). In order to get access to the huge Chinese market, the business 
society lobbied for a more liberal economic policy towards the Mainland, but failed in the 
face of Lee‟s conservative economic stance (Chu, 1997: 242).  
 
On the one hand, since small enterprises had different enterprise backgrounds and 
dispersed economic interests, they were impeded by their lack of strong interest 
representation (Keng and Schubert, 2010: 303). Efficient advocacy of their cross-Strait 
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commercial policies vis-à-vis the Taiwanese government was also absent (Keng and 
Schubert, 2010: 303). On the other hand, even big businesses‟ demand for the 
relaxation of restrictions on cross-Strait economic exchange was ignored by the central 
leadership in Taiwan. After the announcement of the “No Haste, Be Patient” policy, the 
MAC officials urged many large business groups to postpone or scale down their 
ambitious investment projects in Mainland (Chu, 1997: 242). Among them, the most 
famous case was the bargain between Formosa Plastic, the island‟s largest diversified 
business group, and the Taiwanese government over a $7 billion petro-chemical 
complex project across the Strait (Chu, 1997: 242). The economic officials successfully 
persuaded the company to indefinitely postpone the project with both a lucrative 
counter-offer package and an unspoken threat to retrench the credit line from 
state-owned banks (Chu, 1997: 242).  
 
Therefore, the Lee administration successfully resisted the business society‟s demand of 
liberalising cross-Strait economic relations and promoted strong nationalist economic 
policies throughout the 1990s. But why did the Lee administration perceive Taiwan‟s 
economic security in danger? To answer the question, the next section will study two 
external factors, the rise of China and the 1998 Asian Financial Crisis.  
 
EXTERNAL FACTORS  
As shown above, the national security concern in Lee‟s administration explained his 
conservative position in cross-Strait commercial relations. But why did Taiwan feel 
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greatly threatened by China? The following analysis will demonstrate that since 1990 this 
is as a result of the rising of China in economic, diplomatic and military arenas.  
 
The Chinese Factor- The Rise of China 
Economic Development  
China has experienced an economic miracle that has astonished the world in the 1990s. 
Between 1990 and 1999, China‟s GDP growth tripled from $357 billion to $1083 billion, 
and its average GDP growth reached a rate of 10% per annum (World Bank, 2012a&b). 
Meanwhile, Chinese exports quadrupled from $62 billion to $249 billion while foreign 
direct investment (FDI) jumped over eight times from less than $5 billion to more than 
$40 billion (World Bank, 2012c). At the end of the twentieth century, China accounted for 
3.9% of total world exports, making it the largest exporter among the emerging East 
Asian economies and the world‟s seventh largest exporting nation (World Bank, 2012c). 
In 1990, traditional labour-intensive manufactures like textiles, clothing and footwear 
(TCF) dominated China‟s export structure with a share of 25% (Wong and Chan, 2002: 
83). In ten years, however, its manufactured exports were no longer confined to low 
value-added products, but experienced a radical change in composition, marked by the 
rise of more technologically advanced items accounting for the overall exports from 6.1% 
to 16.5% (Wong and Chan, 2002: 83).  
 
Thus, the rapid growth of the Chinese economy created a desirable commercial 
environment that lured Taiwanese businesses to conduct economic exchanges. Many 
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Taiwanese companies were located in China‟s industrial heartland, such as Shanghai, 
Tianjin, Qingdao and Dalian, and got access not only to the supply of cheap labour and 
land, but well-trained technicians and engineers as well as China‟s minimally 
commercialised but relatively advanced technology to minimise their production costs 
and raise corporation profits (Chu, 1997: 240). In addition, the common language and 
shared cultural heritage with China was also a significant source of social empowerment 
for Taiwanese business people (Lee, 2003: 119). Thus, China‟s rapid economic 
development made it an attractive destination for Taiwanese business people. However, 
it also raised the concern of Lee‟s administration regarding China‟s possible exploitation 
of economic tools to gain political leverages against Taiwan, which may undermine 
Taiwan‟s security and „sovereignty‟.  
 
Diplomatic Influence  
Due to its outstanding economic growth, China was able to gain more diplomatic 
influence and exercise this influence to isolate Taiwan in the global arena. During Lee‟s 
Presidency, Taiwan lost three of its important diplomatic allies. Between 1990 and 1992, 
Saudi Arabia and South Korea, established formal diplomatic ties with China, which 
resulted in Taiwan‟s loss of these two diplomatic allies (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC, 
2011&2012). The only remaining important ally in Taiwan‟s diplomatic corps, South 
Africa, also ended its diplomatic relations with Taiwan in 1998 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of PRC, 2011&2012). In addition, through foreign aid programs and investment projects, 
the KMT government made endless efforts to buy diplomatic ties from micro-states 
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(Wang, Lee and Yu, 2011: 252). However, with China‟s economic ascendancy, Beijing 
has countered with its own „dollar diplomacy‟, and three small states, Central African 
Republic, Republic of Guinea-Bissau and Kingdom of Tonga, broke their diplomatic 
relations with Taiwan in 1998, followed by Papua New Guinea in 1999 (Lin, 2008: 14).  
 
Meanwhile, Taiwan‟s efforts to participate in international organisations have also been 
blocked by China. Since 1993, Taiwan tried to solicit help from its allies to file 
applications for UN membership, but failed as a result of PRC‟s strong resistance (Wang, 
Lee and Yu, 2011: 252). In 1996, two significant regional forums, ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF) and the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) passed membership rules that 
required sovereign state as the minimum qualifications, which in essence disqualified 
Taiwan (Wang, Lee and Yu, 2011: 252). Since 1997, Taiwan‟s efforts to enter the World 
Health Organisation (WHO) have been consistently impeded by China, who only 
conceded to let Taiwan‟s medical professionals participate as observers (Lin, 2008: 25). 
Therefore, Taiwan‟s international space was strangled by China‟s diplomatic 
enlargement, which was perceived by the Taiwanese government as a threat to its 
national security.  
 
Military Modernisation  
Above all, what worried Lee‟s administration the most was China‟s use of coercive 
military threat against Taiwan. The concern came to a reality in the 1995 Taiwan Strait 
Missile Crisis, in which China launched a series of large scale military exercises in the 
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Strait. Following Lee Teng-hui‟s private visit to Cornell University in 1995, in order to 
ward off the possible domino effect of Lee‟s U.S. trip and to remind Taiwan and the U.S. 
of the consequences of pursuing/sponsoring Taiwan‟s independence, China conducted 
numerous missile tests and naval and air exercises in the waters near Taiwan in July 
1995.  
 
It launched six surface-to-surface missiles approximately 100 miles from Taiwan (Ross, 
2000: 94). Intending to disrupt Lee‟s re-election, from late January through February in 
1996, the People‟s Liberation Army (PLA) amassed over 100,000 troops in the Fujian 
Province and fired three M-9 missiles into the waters just off the coast of Taiwan‟s two 
largest port cities, one of which was barely twenty miles from the northern port of 
Keelung (Ross, 2000: 107). The military exercises thus heightened Taiwan‟s national 
security concerns because the „threat of China‟ that had been forewarned by Lee‟s 
government for years, demonstrated by China‟s use of military force to address political 
issues, had become a reality.  
 
Overall, the concern of Taiwan‟s national security stemmed from China‟s huge economic 
potential and opportunities, its isolation of Taiwan‟s participation in world affairs, and its 
resolution of coercive military actions, which motivated the Lee administration to adopt a 
strong economic nationalist policy towards the Mainland. In addition to China‟s growing 
power, the next section will discuss an important regional event, which is the 1998 Asian 
Financial Crisis in this period of time.  
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A Regional Event- 1998 Asian Financial Crisis (AFS) 
During Lee Teng-hui‟s era, a significant regional event that had a huge impact on the 
Asian economies was the 1998 Asian Financial Crisis (AFS). Compared to other Asian 
nations who suffered from this crisis, Taiwan weathered well through the crisis and 
minimised the damage that the AFS brought in.  
 
The AFS started with the huge devaluation of Thai currency baht in 1997 and rapidly 
spread to the majority of Southeast Asian countries. Not only were their financial sectors 
hit by stormy shocks, but their production, consumption and investment industries also 
encountered grave setbacks (Yang, 2001:86). Soon afterwards, the AFS spread to East 
Asian nations and greatly damaged their stock markets. Although the crisis also caused 
fluctuations in Taiwan‟s exchange rates, interest rates and share prices, its impact on 
Taiwan was much smaller compared to its neighbours in Asia (Yang, 2001: 81). 
Comparison of Taiwan‟s economic performance to its regional counterparts can be seen 
in Table 3.2. Although Taiwan‟s economic growth rate dropped from 6.7% to 4.6% during 
the AFS, it remained one of the two Asian countries whose growth rate was positive 
(Table 3.2). Its inflation rate and unemployment rates were stable at 1.7% and 2.7% 
respectively in 1998 (Table 3.2). As can be seen from the above figures, Taiwan seemed 
to be least affected by the AFS.  
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Table 3.2: Economic Performance of Asian Economies (1997-1998)  
Unit: percentage (%)  
Country Economic Growth Rate Inflation Rate Unemployment Rate 
1997 1998 1997 1998 1997 1998 
Taiwan 6.7 4.6 0.9 1.7 2.7 2.7 
South Korea 5.0 -5.8 4.4 7.5 2.6 6.8 
Singapore 8.9 0.3 2.0 -0.3 1.8 3.2 
Hong Kong 5.0 -5.1 5.7 2.6 2.4 4.4 
Thailand -1.8 -10.4 5.6 8.1 1.9 4.0 
Malaysia  7.5 -7.5 2.7 5.3 2.4 3.2 
Philippines  5.2 -0.5 5.9 9.8 8.7 10.1 
Indonesia 4.7 -13.2 6.2 58.4 4.7 5.5 
Japan  1.4 -2.8 1.7 0.6 3.4 4.1 
Source: Yang, Y. (2001). „Riding the Wave of the Asian Financial Crisis: Taiwan‟s  
Lessons for Emerging Economies‟, in C. Lee (ed), Taiwan, East Asia and Copenhagen 
Commitment, Chung-hua Institution for Economic Research: Taipei.  
 
As a result of Lee‟s “Go South” policy, Taiwan established a close relationship with 
Southeast Asia, and the latter became the former ‟s major destination for trade and 
investment. However, this commercial relation was greatly undermined during the AFS. 
For example, Taiwan FDI in Thailand fell from $2.8 billion in 1997 to $158 million in 2000 
(Tanner, 2006: 46). Its exports to Malaysia dropped 21.8% in 1999 (MAC, 2002b). 
Therefore, for Taiwan, although the AFS had little impact on its economy, its trade and 
investment relations with Southeast Asia were severely damaged, which made Lee‟s 
attempt to divert Taiwanese investment from China unsuccessful.  
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CONCLUSION 
Overall, Taiwan‟s cross-Strait economic policymaking in Lee Teng-hui‟s administration 
was dominated by strong protectionism policies. Internally, Lee‟s administration ignored 
calls for liberalisation by the Taiwanese business community and insisted pushing for 
restrictive policies towards the Mainland. These nationalist economic policies were 
motivated by the administration‟s concern of Taiwan‟s national security, which stemmed 
from an economically, diplomatically and militarily rising China. The 2000 Presidential 
election raised hope for a change in the cross-Strait commercial relation, and the next 
chapter will examine Taiwan‟s economic policymaking under the Chen Shui-bian 
administration.  
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Chapter Four                                                             
Taiwan’s Cross-Strait Economic Policy under the Chen 
Shui-bian Administration (2000-2007) 
 
The previous chapter has shown why Taiwan under the Lee Teng-hui administration 
adopted aggressive economic nationalist policies towards the Mainland. When Chen 
Shui-bian was elected as the first DPP President in 2000, the new administration initially 
considered China as an opportunity, thus starting to encourage cross-Strait economic 
exchange. In 2001, the DPP government officially discarded Lee Teng-hui‟s “Go Slow, 
Be Patient” policy and replaced it with “Active Opening, Effective Management”, which 
was aimed at relaxing the restrictions on and encouraging economic exchange with the 
Mainland (Tanner, 2006: 53). With the fear of deepening cross-Strait economic 
integration, frustration of diplomatic setbacks and military intimidation, however, the DPP 
government rapidly reverted its liberal strategy back to strong nationalist policies towards 
the Mainland. Not only did the “three direct links” continued to be prohibited, but a new 
policy “Effective Opening, Active Management” aimed at tightening the existing 
commercial links across the Strait was introduced in 2006 (MAC, 2006b).  
 
In this chapter, I will examine why Chen‟s administration initially adopted seemingly 
liberal cross-Strait economic approaches but then changed back to restrictive nationalist 
approaches. Parallel to the structure in Chapter Three, I will first look at two internal 
factors, Taiwan‟s domestic politics and the role of its business community. Then I will 
examine an external factor, China‟s rapid growing expansion, which in this period of time 
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is of great importance to the world. I will utilise a combination of discourse analysis and 
economic data in the following analysis.  
 
INTERNAL FACTORS  
Taiwan’s Domestic Politics  
Taiwan‟s 2000 Presidential election marked a significant milestone in the island‟s 
democratic development as it is the first time an opposition party came to power. The 
DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian, who won with the share of 39% of the votes, defeated 
James Soong, a former governor of Taiwan Province with 37% and KMT‟s candidate 
Lien Chan, the then Vice President in Lee‟s administration with 23% (Wang, 2002: 92). 
Chen‟s victory further complicated cross-Strait relations, not only because the DPP had 
actively promoted Taiwan‟s independence and sovereignty as manifested in its platform 
(DPP, 2010) but also because of Chen‟s previous history as an ardent supporter of the 
independence movement.  
 
A few years before Chen got elected, social attitudes on the pace of cross-Strait 
exchange varied significantly. As Figure 4.1 indicates, although the proportion of 
respondents who believed that the pace was “too slow” tended to increase over time, 
nearly half of the population believed that the pace during Lee‟s Presidency was “just 
right”. Despite of the majority of the public opinion favouring a status quo in the keeping 
the pace as what Lee administration set, later it turned out that Chen‟s administration 
initially did not follow the major trend, but to promote its own economic agenda. 
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Therefore, public opinion did not influence Chen government‟s economic stance towards 
China. Rather, factors other than public opinion accounted for Chen‟s economic position.  
Figure 4.1: The Pace of Cross-Strait Exchange (1996-2001) 
 
Source: Mainland Affairs Council, ROC,                                     
http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/MMO/MAC/9003e_6.gif. 
 
As Chen and the DPP came close to power, pragmatism towards the Mainland seemed 
to dominate. The DPP proclaimed in its 2000 election platform that “Taiwan should also 
seek to normalise ties with China as long-term goals” (DPP, 2000). Although not 
abandoning its principled stance on Taiwan‟s status as an independent nation, the DPP 
seemed to be ready to improve cross-Strait relations. Unlike the previous Lee 
administration‟s tightening up of commercial links with China for reasons of national 
security, Chen‟s initial stance was to promote cross-Strait economic relations as an 
important means to keep peace and stability in the Strait. His idea of expanding trade 
and economic exchange as a source of peaceful relations between nations reflected the 
liberal economic thinking. Table 4.1 below shows ten official government statements 
50 
 
used in this section. The first four statements indicate Chen‟s liberal position as 
demonstrated in the analysis below.  
 
Table 4.1: Taiwan’s Official Government Statements (2000-2007) 
 
Occasion of the 
Speech 
 
Date 
 
Speaker 
(first) Inaugural Speech 20th May 2000 Chen Shui-bian, President 
of the ROC New Year Address 1st January 2001 
Address to the 28th 
Sino-Japanese 
Conference on 
Mainland China 
26th March 2001 Chong-pin Lin, Vice 
Chairman of MAC 
New Year Address 1st January 2002 Chen Shui-bian, President 
of the ROC New Year Address 1st January 2003 
(second) Inaugural 
Speech 
20th May 2004 
Address to the MAC 
Year End Conference 
28th January 2005 N/A 
Address to the 
International 
Conference on the Rise 
of China: Challenges 
and Opportunities 
28th September 2005 Rong-I Wu, Vice Premier of 
the ROC 
MAC Statement: The 
Crises and Risks of the 
Rise of China 
28th October 2005 MAC 
New Year Address 1st January 2006 Chen Shui-bian, President 
of the ROC 
Source: Mainland Affairs Council, ROC, http://www.mac.gov.tw/mp.asp?mp=3 
 
In his inaugural speech in May 2000, Chen not only stressed the harm of war in general, 
but urged that “it is time for the two sides to cast aside the hostilities” (MAC, 2000a). The 
primary concern of Chen‟s government, as shown in the speech, is peace in the Strait. 
Chen then extended his friendly gesture to the Mainland by pledging support for the 
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“Four Nos”9 during his Presidency.  
 
Chen‟s political gestures permitted the possibility of his initial desire to liberalise 
cross-Strait economic relations. As he emphasised in his 2001 New Year address, “the 
two sides should start with the integration of our economies, trade, and culture to 
gradually build a new framework of permanent peace and political integration” (MAC, 
2001a). Later in a conference on Mainland China in March, Dr. Lin Chong-pin, the then 
Vice Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council, not only officially recognised the 
inevitability of “growing and even accelerating economic exchanges” in the Strait, but 
stressed the stance of the DPP government was that “we take pro-active approach on 
promoting socio-economic exchanges across the Taiwan Strait” (MAC, 2001b).  
 
Followed by the introduction of the “Active Opening, Effective Management” policy, Chen 
stressed again in his 2002 New Year speech that “we are prepared to make more active 
efforts to promote a „constructive cooperative relationship‟ in cross-Strait economic and 
trade for the greatest benefit and welfare of all” (MAC, 2002a). Similarly, in his 2003 New 
Year address, he clearly stated that “my administration has pursued stability in 
cross-Strait relations”, and “to make this a primary goal at this stage of cross-Strait 
development … let us begin by creating a common niche for economic development, 
thus fostering an environment conducive to long-term engagement” (MAC, 2003).  
                                                             
9 “Four Nos” refers to “no change of the national title, no independence, no change in 
the Constitution and no referendum”. For full speech, see: MAC (2000), 
http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=50894&ctNode=5913&mp=3&xq_xCat=2000. 
52 
 
Therefore, from the above official statements, it is easy to see that the primary reason 
behind Chen‟s initial efforts to liberalise Taiwan‟s economic exchanges with the Mainland 
is the pursuit of peace and stability in cross-Strait relations. In Chen‟s s second term as 
the President, however, the liberal tone towards the Mainland was dramatically shifted to 
a fairly strong nationalist one. China was again perceived as a threat to Taiwan‟s national 
security and sovereignty, and thus reducing the risks of liberalisation of cross-Strait trade 
and investment seemed to be imperative for the Taiwanese administration. Taiwan‟s 
changing perception of “Chinese threat” in economic, diplomatic and military respects, 
drawn from the last six government documents in Table 4.1, can be demonstrated below. 
 
The first mention of the word “threat” appeared in Chen‟s 2004 inaugural speech. In 
contrast to four years ago, Chen hardened his tone in the speech, and stated that 
“(Taiwan is faced) with an ever-increasing military threat from across the Strait” (MAC, 
2004a). In his year-end press conference in 2005, Jaushieh Wu, Chairman of the MAC, 
also pointed out the military oppression and diplomatic threat of China, as he stated that 
“efforts have been strengthened in (the) arms build-up, military deployment aimed at 
Taiwan, suffocating Taiwan in the international community, or suppressing Taiwan‟s 
international activities (by the Mainland)” (MAC, 2005a). It appears that the primary 
concern of the DPP government had changed from seeking permanent peace with China 
to preventing military intimidation and diplomatic suffocation from the Mainland.  
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Starting from 2005, the Taiwanese government acknowledged in their official documents 
that the threat from China not only came from military and diplomatic arenas, but also 
from the economic sphere. Their concern towards China‟s tactics of obtaining its political 
motives through economic exchanges grew rapidly. As the then Vice Premier Rong-i Wu 
expressed at an international conference in September 2005, “in recent years, Taiwan‟s 
resource and capital have to a certain degree flowed to the other side of the 
Strait…however, it (China) has actually indirectly strengthened China‟s ability to hold 
down Taiwan…the Taiwanese government must completely examine the rate and scope 
of the opening of cross-Strait exchanges in order to preserve social stability and national 
security” (MAC, 2005b).  
 
In the next two months, the MAC produced two other documents commenting on the rise 
of China, and both not only equated “the rise of China” with “Chinese threat”, but called 
for the Taiwanese government “(to) cautiously manage and plan such exchanges to 
safeguard our social stability and national security” (MAC, 2005b&c). In Chen‟s 2006 
New Year speech, he officially introduced the “Active Management, Effective 
Liberalisation” policy in order to “effectively reduce risks from liberalisation (with the 
Mainland) and the reliance on China‟s economy”. What‟s more, in his speech, Chinese 
threat was replaced by even stronger language of “China‟s ambition to annex Taiwan” 
(MAC, 2006a).  
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Furthermore, the DPP administration‟s economic nationalist policies towards China 
cannot be separated from the DPP‟s consistent efforts to raise nationalism awareness in 
Taiwan. Since 2000, Chen has moved the symbol of Taiwan to the centre of politics. He 
not only advanced the use of native Taiwanese languages and indigenous culture, but 
favoured native Taiwanese in hiring (Copper, 2008: 181). In 2005, the website for the 
President‟s Office modified the official title in the home page banner from „Republic of 
China‟ to „Republic of China (Taiwan)‟ (Chang and Holt, 2009: 322).  
 
In addition, Chen was skilful in prioritising „Taiwan‟ ahead of its official name „the 
Republic of China (ROC)‟ in his speeches. Names, particularly in politics, are not labels 
used for convenience, but symbols carefully chosen to define identities (Chang and Holt, 
2009: 303). As can be seen in Table 4.2, in Chen‟s Presidential addresses during his first 
term, Taiwan was mentioned 17.9 times on average, which was almost 4 times more 
than the mention of ROC. However, in his speeches during his second term, ROC 
dwindled while Taiwan increased rapidly in usage. On average, Taiwan was referred to 
43.5 times, which was 15 times more than the frequency of ROC (Table 4.2). The 
excessive emphasis on Taiwan in Chen‟s official addresses reflected the DPP 
government‟s attempts to promote a distinctive Taiwanese national identity. 
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Table 4.2: Frequency of words Taiwan and ROC in Presidential Addresses 
(2000-2008) 
 
 
Occasion of the 
Speech 
Date Taiwan Average 
(Taiwan) 
ROC Average 
(ROC) 
(first) Inaugural 
Speech 
20/05/2000 41  
 
 
 
18 
 
 
 
 
 
9  
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
Address to the 2000 
National Day 
10/10/2000 8 7 
Address to the 2000 
National Day Rally 
10/10/2000 11 5 
Millennium Talk 31/12/2000 20 4 
New Year Day 
Address 
1/1/2001 13 9 
Address to the 2001 
National Day 
10/10/2001 12 3 
Address to the 2001 
National Day Rally 
10/10/2001 14 2 
New Year Day 
Address 
1/1/2002 1 3 
Address to the 2002 
National Day 
10/10/2002 9 3 
Address to the 2002 
National Day Rally 
10/10/2002 28 3 
New Year Day 
Address 
1/1/2003 20 3 
Address to the 2003 
National Day 
10/10/2003 29 3 
Address to the 2003 
National Day Rally 
10/10/2003 24 4 
New Year Day 
Address 
1/1/2004 36  
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3 
(second) Inaugural 
Speech 
20/05/2004 48 8 
Address to the 2004 
National Day 
10/10/2004 26 2 
Address to the 2004 
National Day Rally 
10/10/2004 50 7 
New Year Day 
Address 
1/1/2005 29 3 
Address to the 2005 
National Day 
10/10/2005 24 2 
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Address to the 2005 
National Day Rally 
10/10/2005 32 1 
New Year Day 
Address 
1/1/2006 64 2 
Address to the 2006 
National Day 
10/10/2006 57 2 
Address to the 2006 
National Day Rally 
10/10/2006 19 1 
New Year Day 
Address 
1/1/2007 53 1 
Address to the 2007 
National Day 
10/10/2007 94 1 
New Year Day 
Address 
1/1/2008 68 1 
Source: Chang H. and Holt, R. (2009). „Taiwan and ROC: A Critical Analysis of President 
Chen Shui-bian‟s Construction of Taiwan Identity in National Speech‟, National Identities, 
11 (3), pp. 301-330.  
 
As can be seen, in Chen‟s second term, strong nationalist sentiment prevailed in Taiwan, 
and China was again considered as a threat. Chen‟s government not only tightened 
cross-Strait relations economically, but broke his political promise of “Four Nos” that he 
made in his 2000 inaugural speech. The DPP administration ceased the function of NRC 
and NRG, expedited Taiwan‟s constitution reform, promoted a referendum for Taiwan 
independence and supported joining the UN under the name of Taiwan (Copper, 2008: 
189). But why did the DPP administration change its cross-Strait economic policies form 
initial liberalisation back to restrictions without worrying about the pressure from the 
business groups? In the next section, I will explore how Taiwan‟s business community‟s 
economic demands were not achieved during Chen‟s Presidency.  
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Taiwan’s Business Community 
During Taiwan‟s transition in political power, its business community was also in a 
transitional period of enhancing their collective bargaining capacities. The list of 
Taiwan‟s big business groups who either supported Chen in his campaign or agreed to 
serve as his economic advisor was impressive (Tanner, 2006: 114). Won with just 39% 
of the vote, the DPP administration sought to gain more electoral support from the 
business sectors which were critical to Taiwan‟s economic growth (Copper, 2008: 180). 
Therefore, it initially responded to the business sector‟s demand by loosening the 
cross-Strait economic hurdles which promoted their business interests in China.  
 
However, when the DPP government reverted their cross-Strait policies back to 
protectionism, the business community did not display sufficient electoral power and 
unity to drive Chen from office (Tanner, 2006: 112). Instead, they were constrained by 
pressure from Chen‟s administration. Taiwanese businessmen (taishang) were often 
labeled as “taijian”, literally translated as “traitor to Taiwan” (Tanner, 2006: 122). By 
discrediting taishang‟s motivation and impugning their loyalty to Taiwan, Chen‟s 
administration undermined their political ability to pursue for more preferential treatment 
in cross-Strait relations (Tanner, 2006: 122). The then Vice President Annette Lu was 
one of the officials who attacked taishang on numerous occasions. For instance, in the 
2004 legislative campaign, she suggested that the judgment of business people were 
clouded by their economic interests:  
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   “So many tourists go to China every year, and so many businessmen make 
investment there. They follow what China wants them to do. If China says that it is 
against the holding of referendums, they would reject the idea. If China advocates 
„one China principal [sic],‟ they would believe the idea as well. They cannot tell who 
the enemy is and who the friend is” (ET Today English, 2004).  
 
As discussed earlier in chapter Two, Taiwanese businessmen were quasi-diplomats 
between Taiwan and China. By using such an incredible strong word of „enemy‟, Lu sent 
a fairly clear and explicit message to Taiwan‟s „diplomats‟ that China is the enemy of 
state.  
 
Therefore, the DPP government only responded to the business community‟s appeal of 
liberalising cross-Strait relations for electoral purposes when it came to power in 2000. 
Later, it successfully resisted political pressure from the business community and quickly 
switched back to the previous nationalist economic policies. But why did the DPP 
administration shift their perspective of China quickly from an opportunity to a threat? 
The next section will show that since 2000, this is as a result of a stronger China in 
economic, diplomatic and military aspects.  
 
EXTERNAL FACTORS  
The Chinese Factor- A Stronger China 
During Chen‟s Presidential terms, China had become a stronger neighbour of Taiwan. 
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Both the DPP administration‟s initial expansion of cross-Strait economic exchange and 
later restrictive policies as well as the “Chinese threat” perspective were responses to a 
rapidly stronger China, which can be examined from three sources: economic 
development, diplomatic influence and military power.  
 
Economic Development  
Compared to its predecessor, Chen‟s government faced an economically stronger China. 
Between 2000 to 2007, China‟s economic growth and trade was impressive. Its GDP 
nearly tripled from $1trillion to $3 trillion, making China the fourth largest economy in the 
world at the start of 2005 (World Bank, 2012b). Its trade performance was even more 
impressive. Chinese exports rose from $249 billion in 2000 to $1218 billion in 2007, 
making it the world‟s second largest exporter only after Germany (China Statistical 
Yearbook, 2001&2008). Meanwhile, its imports grew seven times to $96 billion in 2007 
from 2000, making it the third largest import nation in the world and its inward foreign 
direct investment (FDI) also doubled, making it the world‟s third-largest recipient of FDI 
(China Statistical Yearbook, 2001&2008).  
 
Furthermore, China has become more actively engaged in regional integration. In the 
early 1990s, China was not enthusiastic of formal, structured regional trade 
arrangements. However, after the 1998 financial crisis and its membership in the WTO in 
2001, China has actively engaged in strengthening economic ties with its neighbours 
and promoting East Asian economic integration for long-term gain. For example, China 
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beat Japan and Korea to be the first to sign a free trade agreement with ASEAN, which 
encompassed a population of nearly two billion people and was expected to rival the EU 
and the North American Free Trade Zone (Wang, 2004: 34). In the first decade of the 
twenty-first century, the Chinese economy has become interdependent with the world.  
 
In contrast to China‟s remarkable economic growth, Taiwan has witnessed an economic 
downturn during Chen‟s terms. Taiwan experienced more than 2% negative growth as 
government spending exceeded revenues by almost 50% and public debt encompassed 
45% of the GDP (Chai, 2008: 88). Its GDP per capita stood at $12,961 in 2000, which 
was 17 times more than that of China (China Statistical Yearbook, 2001). Eight years 
later, the gap decreased to only 4 times more (China Statistical Yearbook, 2008). In 2000, 
Taiwanese exports in the U.S. accounted for 3.3% of U.S.‟s total exports, which was less 
than half of China‟s share of 8.2% (MAC, 2008d). In 2007, however, Taiwanese exports 
shares in the U.S. market declined to only 1.9% whereas Chinese products rose to over 
16%, which stretched the gap to eight-fold (MAC, 2008d).  
 
After Chen‟s initial economic opening in late 2001, the economic integration between 
China and Taiwan grew dramatically. In two years, total Taiwanese trade increased 1.7 
times from $27.8 billion to $46.3 billion (MAC, 2008d). The share of cross-Strait trade in 
Taiwan‟s total foreign trade jumped from 12% in 2001 to 17% in 2003, making China the 
largest importer of Taiwanese goods since 2002 (MAC, 2008d). However, given China‟s 
large economies of scale, the cross-Strait economic ties were asymmetric in nature. In 
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2007, cross-Strait trade represented approximately 30% of Taiwan‟s total trade, but only 
about 5% of China‟s total trade (MAC, 2008d). Cross-Strait investment flows were even 
more imbalanced. In 2007, China attracted 60% of Taiwan‟s total FDI such that it 
became the foremost destination for Taiwan‟s foreign investment, but Taiwanese 
investment in China represented only 2.3% of the Mainland‟s total inflows of FDI (MAC, 
2008d).  
 
It thus can be seen that when China has become interdependent with the world, Taiwan 
has become over-dependent on China, which was the source of the DPP government‟s 
concern. As they suggested in a statement, “China has taken advantage of close 
bilateral trading and economic exchanges in strengthening its influence over Taiwan‟s 
political and social quarters” (MAC, 2005c), they perceived China‟s economic superiority 
would be likely to increase its political leverage over Taiwan and diversified its means to 
constrain Taiwan‟s independence movement. Therefore, China‟s speedy economic 
growth in this period of time lured the Chen administration to relax the cross-Strait 
economic restrictions initially, but later, also intensified the latter‟s sense of threat 
towards the former. 
 
Diplomatic Influence  
As a result of its economic advantage, China was able to exercise its growing diplomatic 
influence to further isolate Taiwan internationally. Through foreign aid programs and 
investment projects, the DPP governments continued the previous administration‟s 
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efforts to buy diplomatic ties (Wang, Lee and Yu, 2011: 252). However, with China‟s 
economic ascendance and its unyielding stance on the „one China‟ policy, Beijing has 
countered with its own „dollar diplomacy‟, and the number of countries that recognise 
Taiwan as a sovereign state has continued to dwindle. During Chen‟s presidency, 
Taiwan‟s diplomatic allies decreased from 28 to 23 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
ROC, 2000).  
 
Besides, Taiwan‟s efforts to participate in international organisations, even those 
non-political in nature, have been relentlessly blocked by China. For instance, the Chen 
administration intended to send Lee Yuan-tsu, a former Vice President, as the 
representative of ROC to attend the 2001 APEC summit in Shanghai (Wang, 2002: 112). 
However, Beijing refused to issue Lee an invitation on the grounds that Taiwan could 
send only a high-ranking economic official to APEC, which resulted in Taiwan‟s absence 
from the summit (Wang, 2002: 112). Even during SARS in 2003, the Chinese 
government refused to grant Taiwan the right to participate in the WHO since “Taiwan is 
a province of China” (Wang, Lee and Yu, 2011: 256). Its attempt to establish closer ties 
with the regional organisations also failed. In the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami disaster, 
its request to attend the world relief summit organised by ASEAN was turned down, 
despite Taiwan being the eighth largest donor to the neighbouring countries which 
suffered in the disaster (Hsiung, 2006: 263).  
 
With China‟s expanding economic strength, as a MAC (2005c) statement said, “from the 
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diplomatic aspect, it (China) has continued to suppress Taiwan‟s activities in the 
international arena and further restricted other countries from developing any form of 
relations with Taiwan”. Therefore, diplomatic frustration changed the DPP government‟s 
perspective on China, from an opportunity to a threat, at least diplomatically. However, 
the biggest threat they feared was China‟s growing military strength, which brought back 
strong nationalist sentiment in the authority.  
 
Military Modernisation  
China‟s rapid military modernisation, due to its outstanding economic achievement, 
increased the gradual shifting of cross-Strait military balance, which greatly threatened 
Taiwan‟s national security.  
 
Since the mid-1990s, the PLA has accelerated modernisation with the goal of developing 
military options for potential Taiwan scenarios (U.S. Department of Defense, 2005: i). 
During Chen‟s Presidency, China‟s military capability has improved significantly. 
Between 2000 and 2005, China‟s defense budget doubled to $29.9 billion (U.S. 
Department of Defense, 2005: 21). The sharp increase in its defense budget allowed the 
military to spend on weapons procurement and upgrades, troop training and 
communication, computer and intelligence improvement (Yang, 2004: 9). The number of 
China‟s mid- and short-range (300-600 kilometres) ballistic missiles including 
Dongfeng-11 and Dongfeng-15 missiles deployed opposite to the shore of Taiwan 
reached 650-730, and the number was increasing at a rate of 100 per year (U.S. 
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Department of Defense, 2005: 4). In addition to ballistic missiles, procurement to build a 
sea denial capability, especially naval and air force platforms have also been prioritised 
by the PLA (Ding, 2009: 99).  
 
In contrast to China‟s growing military spending, Taiwan‟s military budget demonstrated 
a gradual decline in its GDP from 2.91% in 2000 to 2.21% in 2006 (GlobalSecurity, 2012). 
U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have been the major source for the island to upgrade its 
military equipment. However, arms sales have been restrained as a part of the American 
pledge in the “third U.S-China Joint Communiqué” (Kastner, 2006: 91).  
 
Taiwan‟s acquisition of military equipment was also constrained by its democratic system. 
Since the DPP government controlled the executive branch in 2000, the opposition 
forces dominated the legislature and heavily politicised arms procurement in Taiwan 
(Lee, 2007: 220). They opposed huge arms purchases from the U.S. based on concerns 
of the price, suitability and capability of purchased weapons (Lee, 2007: 220). Between 
2001 to 2004, the government faced enormous protests and criticisms led by the 
opposition parties against the $3 billion funding for the Kidd-class destroyer program, 
though they ultimately succeeded in purchasing the package in 2005 (Yang, 2004: 10).  
Except for the purchase of the destroyers and two long range Early Warning Radar 
Systems, there has not been much progress in Taiwan‟s procurement of those big-ticket 
items offered by the U.S. (Kastner, 2006: 100). Its defense strategy has been heavily 
dependent on missiles that are guided by satellite in the same way that the U.S. military 
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uses satellite technology for strategic strikes, which the Chinese government has been 
studying extensively in the Yugoslavia conflicts and Iraq War (Lin, 2008: 38). As a result 
of Taiwan‟s sagging economy, a limited defense budget and inner political struggle, the 
military capability balance between China and Taiwan was gradually shifting in China‟s 
favour.  
 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, the DPP government gradually opened Taiwan‟s economic interactions with 
China when it came to power initially. It responded to the business community‟s demand 
of a more liberal environment for cross-Strait relations. However, as a consequence of 
China‟s expanding economic material strength, the administration was concerned about 
Taiwan‟s economy becoming over-dependent on Mainland China, as well as its 
diplomatic frustration and military threat. Thus, Chen‟s administration switched its 
cross-Strait economic strategy back to the nationalist policies of tightening its regulations, 
ignoring the business community‟s pursuits as what the previous administration did. It is 
apparent that the rise of China in economic, diplomatic and military arenas under Chen‟s 
terms created a vast power disparity between China and Taiwan and thus raised 
Taiwan‟s sense of threat. The economic situation, however, changed dramatically when 
the KMT‟s candidate Ma Ying-jeou was elected as the President in 2008. The next 
chapter will examine Taiwan‟s economic policymaking under his administration.  
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Chapter Five                                                           
Taiwan’s Cross-Strait Economic Policy under the Ma 
Ying-jeou Administration (2008-Present) 
 
The previous chapter gives a thorough analysis of why Taiwan under the governance of 
Chen Shui-bian took an initial liberal position but soon reverted to the nationalist 
approaches in its cross-Strait economic policymaking. At the end of Chen‟s Presidency, 
Taiwan and China were hostile to each other, as was previously the case. The year of 
2008, however, marked a dramatic change in their relationship. After the KMT candidate 
Ma Ying-jeou won the 2008 election, his administration actively proposed and quickly 
implemented a liberal economic strategy towards China that aimed for expanding 
bilateral economic relations and deepening commercial exchanges. Less than one year 
since Ma assumed the Presidency, the new administration launched the “three direct 
links”10 that have long been contested across the Strait (MAC, 2009b). Furthermore, the 
signing of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) between the two 
sides in mid-2010 pushed the bilateral economic relations even closer (MAC, 2009b).  
 
In this chapter, I will explain what motivated Ma‟s administration to adopt liberal 
economic policies towards the Mainland and argue that these liberal economic 
approaches actually serve three nationalist goals. Identical to the previous two chapters, 
I will first look at two internal factors, Taiwan‟s domestic politics and the role of its 
business society. Then, I will examine two external factors, a more confident China, and 
                                                             
10 Three direct links are: direct trade, transportation and communication.  
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an important regional/global event, which in this period, namely the 2008 Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC). For both factors, I will use a mix of discourse analysis and 
descriptive statistics to support the following argument.  
 
INTERNAL FACTORS  
Taiwan’s Domestic Politics  
In January and March 2008, the KMT won landslide victories in Taiwan‟s parliamentary 
and presidential elections respectively, marking its return to the centre of Taiwan‟s 
politics after eight years in exile. Since Ma Ying-jeou was sworn in as the President in 
May 2008, the Taiwanese government adopted a new approach towards the Mainland 
that contrasted starkly with previous administrations. Politically, Ma pledged no change 
of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait under the principle of “Three Nos” 11(MAC, 2008a). 
He also proposed that negotiations between Taiwan and China should be based on the 
“One China, Different Interpretations” consensus, which was reached by the 
non-governmental representatives of Association of Relationship Across the Taiwan 
Straits (ARATS) and the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) in 1992 (MAC, 2008a). 
Both of his promises indicated a friendly gesture to the Mainland, that during his tenure, 
Taiwan will not pursue independence, though he also denied the possibility of unifying 
with China. In addition to political gestures, the Ma administration keenly focused on 
accelerating the normalisation and expansion of cross-Strait economic relations.  
Few years before Ma got elected, social attitudes on the pace of cross-Strait exchange 
                                                             
11 “Three Nos” refers to “no unification, no independence and no use of force”. 
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fluctuated. As Figure 5.1 shows, the proportion of respondents who believed that the 
pace of cross-Strait exchanges was “too slow” increased from 25% in 2006 to 35% in 
2008. However, people who believe that the pace was “just right” constituted the largest 
proportion of 40%. Similar to the Chen administration, the Ma government did not follow 
the majority of the public opinion and pursued its own economic agenda. Therefore, 
public opinion did not account for Ma administration‟s economic stance towards China. 
Then I will examine internal factors other than the public opinion, which in this period of 
time, is what President Ma said in numerous occasions.  
Figure 5.1: The Pace of Cross-Strait Exchange (2000-2008) 
 
Source: Mainland Affairs Council, ROC, 
http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/911813121050.gif  
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In the following formal speeches and government statements, which are listed in Table 
5.1, Ma switched from aggressive nationalism to liberal nationalism by using liberal 
rhetoric. As can be demonstrated in Table 5.1, Ma brought up the concept of „Taiwan‟ a 
lot, meanwhile, he also mentioned „China‟ quite frequently in his speeches. Unlike his 
predecessor Chen, exclusive Taiwanese identity was no longer the focus, but the 
following three nationalist goals emerged to be the new centre of his speeches.  
 
Table 5.1: Taiwan’s Official Government Statements (2008-Present) 
Occasion of the 
speech 
Date Speaker Mention of 
Taiwan 
(times) 
Mention of 
Mainland China 
(times) 
(first) Inaugural 
Speech 
20th May 
2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ma 
Ying-jeou, 
President of 
the ROC 
53 7 
Address to 
National Day 
10th October 
2008 
25 1 
New Year Address 1st January 
2009 
37 5 
Address to the 
Europe Day Dinner  
14th May 
2009 
N/A N/A 
Address to 
National Day 
10th October 
2010 
44 12 
Discussion with 
Taiwan‟s experts 
on PRC military 
affairs 
28th October 
2010 
N/A N/A 
(second) Inaugural 
Speech 
20th May 
2012 
55 6 
Source: Mainland Affairs Council, ROC, http://www.mac.gov.tw/mp.asp?mp=3 
 
The first goal of Ma‟s administration was to achieve peace and co-prosperity through 
deepening economic relations with the Mainland. In his inaugural speech in May 2008, 
Ma spent one quarter of the speech explaining his new mission to deal with cross-Strait 
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relations in his era, which demonstrated its significance to Taiwan (MAC, 2008a). The 
most frequent word he used in this section is “peace”, which appeared 7 times (MAC, 
2008a). With a concluding remark of “we care about peaceful development of 
cross-Strait relations”, Ma explicitly and clearly stressed the importance of peace and 
regional stability in the Taiwan Strait.  
 
In his National Day address, Ma further stressed that “our efforts to alleviate cross-trait 
confrontation, create a new dynamic for peace and enhance stability” (MAC, 2008c). The 
pursuit of peace and stability is not only a “win-win solution” in his own words, but can be 
achieved through “the normalisation of economic and cultural relations, (which) are the 
first step” (MAC, 2008c). As shown in Chapter Two, in addition to liberal economic 
nationalists, economic liberals also believed that increasing economic exchange are a 
source of peaceful relations among countries as mutual benefits would tend to promote 
(Mill, 1848: 120). The first goal might not be obvious to show the nationalist ambitions of 
Ma‟s administration, but the second and the third will reveal this nationalist goal more 
obviously. The second motivation of Ma‟s liberal cross-Strait economic policy is to 
improve Taiwan‟s global economic standing. In his 2009 New Year‟s address, Ma clearly 
stated that “we should seize this opportunity to enhance Taiwan‟s economic standing in 
the world”, and by “this opportunity”, he means “the increasing interdependence between 
Taiwan and China” indicated in the following sentence (MAC, 2009a). Five months later 
during his Europe Day Dinner statement, he actively promoted the idea of ECFA, aiming 
to “encourage foreign companies to do business in Taiwan, avoid Taiwan being 
71 
 
marginalised, upgrade its industrial competitiveness, bring its economy to international 
standards, and enhance its global standing” (MAC, 2009b).  
 
Although implicitly stated, in practical terms, Ma considered expanding commercial links 
with the Mainland as a jumping board to attracting other trading partners and increasing 
its international economic competitiveness. ECFA is obviously a starting point for Taiwan, 
and Ma‟s economic strategy is to integrate Taiwan with the rest of the world through the 
deepening link with the Mainland first. He frequently, for example, at the 2010 National 
Day address, called for Taiwan‟s attention to “recognise the importance of economic 
integration in the Asia-Pacific region and the economic rise of China”, as well as a 
smartly put metaphor that “we certainly cannot afford to play the ostrich by burying our 
heads in the sand” (MAC, 2010a). Even in his second inaugural speech in May 2012, Ma 
made sure that he clearly expressed the message to the world that “we (Taiwan) must 
speedily complete follow-up talks under the ECFA and expedite on economic 
cooperation agreements with (other) important trading partners” (MAC, 2012a). This 
sense of urgency to bolster Taiwan‟s national economy no doubt pushed its 
government‟s liberal policies towards the Mainland.  
 
The third driver of the Ma administration‟s liberal policy was to achieve a diplomatic truce 
with the Mainland and thus winning Taiwan more international space. In his inaugural 
speech in 2008, Ma made it clear that “Taiwan doesn't just want security and prosperity. 
It wants dignity” (MAC, 2008a). By dignity, he referred to “Taiwan no longer being 
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isolated in the international arena” (MAC, 2008a). He realised that without the 
improvement of cross-Strait relations as foundations, Taiwan could not improve its image 
in the world. Thus, during his Europe Day Dinner address in 2009, Ma explained the 
“essence of „diplomatic truce‟ and „flexible diplomacy‟”, which is “taking the initiative in 
starting a vicious cycle of cross-Strait interaction in the world” (MAC, 2009b). For years, 
the fear of being politically manipulated by the Mainland through its economic means 
dominated the Taiwanese government‟s cross-Strait economic debate. Ironically, Ma‟s 
administration tried to gain benefits diplomatically by increasing its economic ties with 
the Mainland, which reversed the direction of the concern.  
As Ma told Taiwan‟s PRC military experts, “our defense force are not the only means for 
safeguarding security in the Taiwan Strait, which is why the government is actively 
promoting cross-Strait economic and cultural ties” (MAC, 2010b), it is evident that what 
motivated Ma‟s liberal cross-Strait economic policymaking were nationalist goals: 
maintaining peace and stability in the Strait, increasing Taiwan‟s economic 
competitiveness as well as playing a more important diplomatic role in the world. Thus, 
Ma‟s attempts to liberalise cross-Strait exchanges can be classified as liberal economic 
nationalist approaches. The next section examines the role of Taiwan‟s business society 
and how Ma Ying-jeou‟s administration responded to their demands.  
 
Taiwan’s Business Society 
Unlike the previous administrations, Ma‟s government not only supported Taiwanese 
business community‟s demands, but achieved what it had long advocated: an open 
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business environment trading with and investing in China. In his inaugural speech in 
2008, Ma particularly emphasised that “Taiwan‟s enterprises should be encouraged to 
establish themselves at home, network through the Asia-Pacific region, and position 
themselves globally” (MAC, 2008a).  
 
Later, during his meeting with delegates from the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) 
who were heading to China for cross-Strait economic negotiations, Ma stated that “no 
individual or group of persons can sell out Taiwan”, and he added that “the so-called 
„betrayal of Taiwan‟ is an expression based on a way of thinking from 20 or 30 years ago” 
(MAC, 2009d). Ma‟s statement intended not only to negate the previous DPP 
government‟s portrayal of Taiwanese businessmen (taishang) as traitors because they 
demanded more liberal economic policies, but relieved the potential political pressure for 
SEF to seek a closer tie with the Mainland. In his ECFA debate with the opposition leader 
Ing-wen Tsai in 2010, Ma Ying-jeou used an example of the small enterprise he visited in 
Taichung, a city located in the west-central Taiwan, to illustrate that signing of ECFA 
would be beneficial to both big- and small- to medium-sized enterprises (Taiwan News, 
2010).  
 
The 2012 Presidential election not only marked the victory of Ma Ying-jeou, but 
witnessed a bigger role of the taishang in influencing the island‟s Presidential race. 
When Ma faced a vigorous challenge from Tsai, taishang executives urged their 
compatriots to return home to vote for Ma (Jacobs, 2012b). In his interview with the New 
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York Times, Mr. Lin Qingfa, chairman of the Beijing Association of Taiwan Enterprises, 
confirmed the concern that many taishang had for this election: “there is a feeling that if 
Tsai Ing-wen is elected, cross-Strait relations will suffer and so will our business 
opportunities” (Jacobs, 2012a). Business leaders also arranged for discounted plane 
tickets, pressed Chinese and Taiwanese airlines to add 200 flights so that taishang were 
able to fly back and vote, which made an estimated 200,000 people return to Taiwan for 
the election (Jacobs, 2012a). Thus, it can be seen that the Taiwanese business 
community welcomed the economic benefits that were generated from the liberal 
economic policies Ma advocated in his first term and helped Ma win the 2012 
Presidential battle.  
 
EXTERNAL FACTORS  
The Chinese Factor- A More Confident China 
Since late 2000s, China has gradually increased its confidence in its role in the world. 
The KMT government under Ma‟s leadership realised the inevitability of China‟s global 
influence, thus smartly shifting its cross-Strait strategy to active engagement with its 
powerful neighbour across the Strait. But where had China‟s confidence come from? The 
following analysis will demonstrate that since 2008, this is as a result of China‟s 
continuing economic development, its growing diplomatic influence and increasing 
military power.  
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Economic Development  
The Chinese economy has continued its phenomenal growth during Ma‟s era, which has 
built the foundation of China‟s confidence. Its GDP increased 1.7 times from $4.5 trillion 
in 2008 to $7.3 trillion in 2011, surpassing Japan to become the world‟s second largest 
economy in 2010 (World Bank, 2012b). Its annual GDP growth rate still remained robust 
with an average rate of 9.5% over the past four years (World Bank, 2012a). Although its 
exports suffered a 10% decrease and imports merely increased 4% in 2009 due to the 
Global Financial Crisis (GFC), its trade bounced back strongly with a 28% and 10% 
increase in the respective sector in the following year. Breaking down the trade 
components, its merchandise exports and imports ranked the first and the second place 
in the world respectively in 2010 (WTO, 2012).  
 
As China‟s economic development has continued to grow, so too has its economic 
integration in the Asian region. China‟s free trade agreement with ASEAN, which came 
into effect at the beginning of 2010 is a typical example of China‟s expanding economic 
cooperation in the region, as well as the source of the Taiwanese government‟s 
economic concern. The “ASEAN+1” and “ASEAN+3” arrangements, which were 
expected to cause Taiwan‟s actual GDP to drop by 0.15% and 1.1% respectively, 
prevented Taiwan‟s businesses from competing effectively in the Asian market and 
would potentially cause eventual regional marginalisation (Jin, 2003: 15).  
 
As Ma said in his press conference following his inauguration in 2008, “we (Taiwan) 
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could be marginalised in the future if that organisation (ASEAN) becomes the largest 
economic integration entity not just in Asia but in the world” (MAC, 2008b). In February 
2010 he explained the major reason for Taiwan to sign ECFA with the Mainland, namely 
that “Taiwan‟s competitiveness will be adversely affected by the free trade agreement 
between the ASEAN and the Mainland” (MAC, 2010c). As such, Ma‟s administration had 
no choice but to seek a liberal and open economic strategy facing its economically 
confident neighbour, or otherwise being marginalised in a world that has been engaging 
with China economically.  
 
Diplomatic Influence  
China also shifted its previous diplomatic tactic of blockading Taiwan on the global stage. 
First, China redefined the principles of “One China”. Previous Chinese leaders were 
more interested in using nationalistic rhetoric such as “Taiwan is an inalienable part of 
China” or advocated the “One Country, Two Systems” policy (The Central Government of 
the PRC, 1993). Contrary to his predecessors, Hu Jintao, the incumbent President of 
China, not only endorsed the concept of “One China, Different Interpretations”, or the 
“1992 Consensus” and promoted this both regionally and internationally (Xinhua Net, 
2008). In a telephone conversation with President Bush in March 2008, a week after 
Ma‟s Presidential election, Hu clearly stated that “the Chinese Mainland should restore 
consultations and talks on the basis of the „1992 Conesus‟” (Xinhua Net, 2008).  
 
China not only softened its diplomatic tones to Taiwan, but lessened constraints on the 
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latter‟s activities in the world. Since Ma assumed Presidency, China refrained from its 
previous money diplomacy of buying Taiwan‟s diplomatic allies (Lin, 2008: 14). Unlike 
previous governments, Ma‟s administration did not lose any diplomatic allies, and the 
number remained at 23 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of ROC, 2012). In addition to stop 
fighting with Taiwan for its diplomatic partners, China also allowed Taiwan to participate 
in some of the international organisations. One year after Ma‟s Presidential victory, 
former Vice President Lien Chan, represented Taiwan to attend the 2009 APEC 
Economic Leaders‟ Meeting in Singapore (MAC, 2009b). In the same year, Taiwan finally 
acceded to the World Health Assembly (WHA) as an observer under the name of 
Chinese Taipei after 12 years pushing for participation (MAC, 2009b). These seeming 
diplomatic successes of Taiwan, yet, would not be thinkable without China‟s 
acquiescence. Thus, with its strong economic background, China‟s greater flexibility on 
Taiwan‟s international status reflected the former‟s increasing confidence.  
 
Military Modernisation  
Lastly, rapid military development complements the economic and diplomatic factors to 
provide China with more confidence in dealing with Taiwan. As the annual report on the 
PRC‟s military development produced by the U.S. Department of Defense (2011:7) 
pointed out, “the balance of military force continued to shift in China‟s favour”. Its 
sustained economic growth has enabled China to focus greater resources on the army. 
One measure of increasing resources for the PLA is its continued growth in annual 
official budget, which almost doubled from $60.1 billion in 2008 to $106 billion in 2012 
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(U.S. Department of Defense, 2008 & 2012).  
 
Another measure is the acquisition of advanced weaponry. Formerly, Taiwan could rely 
on its smaller but better equipped military to keep the PLA at bay, however, the latter‟s 
revolutionary progress in acquiring state-of-the-art combat capabilities means that 
Taiwan‟s qualitative edge is rapidly diminishing (Zhang, 2011: 278). As Murray from the 
U.S. Naval War College (2008: 13) outlines in his article, “new Chinese submarines, 
advanced surface-to-air missiles, and especially short-range ballistic and land-attack 
cruise missiles have greatly reduced Taiwan‟s geographical advantage. Taipei can no 
longer expect to counter Chinese military strengths in a symmetrical manner”. The most 
advanced Chinese fighters (such as the J-10s and FC-1s) and naval warships (such as 
China‟s equivalent of the American Aegis-class destroyers) now match the current 
capacities of Taiwan‟s U.S.-supplied inventories (Zhang, 2011: 278).  
With China‟s growing confidence, yet, Taiwan chose to adopt a liberal approach in 
cross-Strait economic relations because Taiwan realised that it could no longer resist 
China‟s global economic, diplomatic and military superiority. In addition to China‟s 
growing confidence, the next section will examine an important world event, which in 
Ma‟s tenure, is the 2008 Global Financial Crisis.  
 
A Global Event- 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) 
The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 triggered the largest global 
financial tsunami since the Great Depression of 1930s. Those economies whose 
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financial sectors had been highly internationalised and whose economies were closely 
linked to the U.S. were severely affected. Although the extent of asset destruction in 
Taiwan was limited because the level of financial internationalisation still remained low, 
Taiwan‟s export performance was badly impacted as a result of the worsening economic 
climate in North America and Europe, Taiwan‟s major trading partners, leading to rapidly 
declining import demand (Wang, 2010: 254). Take the year of 2009 for example: 
Taiwan‟s exports to the U.S., Japan and the United Kingdom declined 23.5%, 17.4% and 
17.9% respectively compared to the previous year (MAC, 2011). Taiwanese exports to 
China decreased at the same time, however, the overall trade surplus of Taiwan in 2009 
was $38 billion, which largely outweighed its world trade surplus of $29 billion (MAC, 
2011). In other words, Taiwan‟s world trade balance would be in deficit without trade with 
the Mainland.  
 
As Ma (MAC, 2009b) stated in the National Day Address in 2009, “our (Taiwanese) 
government immediately responded to these challenges with deliberate and measure 
action”, among which “open(ing) up new vistas for business by liberalising restrictions on 
economic interchange between Taiwan and mainland China” was one of the important 
solutions. Thus, to Ma‟s administration, opening up Taiwan‟s economy to the Mainland 
and promoting the signing of ECFA would be a significant strategy for expanding 
Taiwan‟s access to the huge Chinese market and stimulating its economy to tackle the 
GFC. Therefore, the GFC weakened the global position of most major economies but 
China, which furthered Taiwan‟s understanding of the importance of Chinese economy 
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and pushed its own economy to integrate with the Mainland‟s.   
 
CONCLUSION 
Overall, since Ma Ying-jeou was elected as ROC‟s President, Taiwan adopted a whole 
new set of strategies towards the Mainland. His administration extended political 
gestures to China by pledging to act under the “1992 Consensus” and “Three Nos” 
principles, and followed its business groups‟ strong demands of liberalising and 
expanding cross-Strait economic exchanges. These liberal economic policies, however, 
serve three nationalist goals of maintaining peace in the Strait, improving Taiwan‟s 
economic status and gaining Taiwan more diplomatic flexibility. Having the same 
purpose to safeguard the core national interests of Taiwan, Ma realised the vast power 
differential across the Strait economically, diplomatically and militarily, and thus chose a 
different way of interacting with the Mainland. The strategy appeared to be effective as it 
not only enabled Ma to be re-elected, but greatly reduced the tension across the Strait 
and promoted mutual economic benefits.  
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Chapter Six- Conclusion                                                     
Taiwan’s Changing Cross-Strait Economic Policymaking  
 
This thesis has demonstrated that Taiwan‟s economic policymaking towards Mainland 
China has changed over the past two decades. Focusing on economic nationalist and 
economic liberalist perspectives, the study has analysed Taiwan‟s cross-Strait economic 
policies under three distinctive Taiwanese administrations: Lee Teng-hui (1990-1999), 
Chen Shui-bian (2000-2007) and Ma Ying-jeou (2008-Present). In each period of time, 
both Taiwan‟s internal factors and external factors have been considered. What has 
been shown is that the external factor, China‟s growing power in economic, diplomatic 
and military arenas, has driven Taiwan‟s changing commercial relationship with China 
since the 1990s. It has also demonstrated that different policy choices taken by different 
Taiwanese administrations were motivated by the same nationalist goal of protecting 
Taiwan‟s security and maintaining its „sovereignty‟. The concluding chapter first 
reiterates the history of Taiwan‟s political economy and explains why two economic 
theoretical approaches were taken to study its changing commercial relationship with 
China since the 1990s. It then presents the key findings and the implications for future 
research.  
 
HISTORY OF TAIWAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY  
Cross-Strait trade and investment flows were prohibited under the leadership of Chiang 
Kai-shek, who lost the Mainland to the CCP in 1949. Chiang Ching-kuo, Chiang 
Kai-shek‟s son, took over the Presidency in 1978 and concentrated on building up 
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Taiwan‟s economy. From 1949 to 1986, Taiwan‟s average economic growth reached 8.8% 
per annum and its GNP per capita increased 36-fold from $100 to $3,600 (Wade, 2004: 
38). All of these accomplishments can be attributed to Taiwan‟s developmental state 
model, which is a political economy in East Asia that is distinctive from the 
Anglo-American liberal market model.  
 
In Taiwan, the state enjoyed a high degree of autonomy which enabled it to influence the 
decision making in the private sector. With the planning and guidance of two of its 
economic bureaucracies, CEPD and IDB, the Taiwanese government prioritised the use 
of resources for industries critical to its economic growth and focused on an 
export-driven economic strategy (Wade, 2004: 26). As a result of its outstanding 
economic achievement, Taiwan, along with South Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong, 
has been internationally known as one of Asia‟s four little dragons.   
 
During the same period, China also started to open up to the world and experienced 
rapid economic development. Although cross-Strait trade and investment were still 
officially prohibited under Chiang Ching-kuo‟s earlier rule, great change took place 
several years before his death. Within Taiwan, the DPP, Taiwan‟s first opposition party 
was officially recognised in 1986 and the martial law was lifted in 1987, which marked a 
great step in Taiwan‟s democratization (Cheng and Lin, 1999: 236). Outside of Taiwan, 
indirect trade through Hong Kong and small-scale investment across the Taiwan Strait 
were permitted in 1985, and Taiwanese were allowed to visit the Mainland in 1987 
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(Tanner, 2006: 39). Flows of trade and investment across the Strait thus emerged. 
However, Taiwan‟s economic policymaking towards the Mainland has varied since the 
1990s. Through the lenses of economic nationalism and economic liberalism, the next 
section examines different policies taken by three different Taiwanese administrations 
and explains the nationalist motivations underpinning the policy choices.  
 
THE IMPORTANCE OF NATIONALISM  
Taiwan‟s relationship with China is not an official diplomatic one as the former has not 
been recognised as a country, but rather dominated by economic links. Given the 
uniqueness of this case study, it is appropriate to introduce two IPE theories, economic 
nationalism and economic liberalism, as foundations to understand this changing 
commercial relation over the last two decades. By tracing the evolution of Taiwan‟s 
economic policymaking towards China under three distinctive Taiwanese administrations, 
we witness an empirical example of the competition between these two theories.  
 
Under the Lee Teng-hui administration, the thesis has shown that classical economic 
nationalism was the mainstream thinking that dominated Taiwan‟s economic 
policymaking towards the Mainland. The core of the Lee administration‟s concerns was 
Taiwan‟s national security. In their view, cross-Strait economic policy should be 
subordinated to Taiwan‟s national interests, and when the acceleration of cross-Strait 
commercial exchanges was likely to give China more political leverage and compromise 
Taiwan‟s „sovereignty‟, the commercial exchanges were restricted. Therefore, Lee‟s 
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government accepted strong economic nationalist measures towards cross-Strait trade 
and investment, including the “Go South” policy in 1993,  the “No Haste, Be Patient” 
policy in 1996 and the continuing restrictions on the “three direct links” (Tanner, 2006: 45). 
In Lee‟s Presidency, strong economic protectionism against China was observed to be 
an important way of safeguarding Taiwan‟s security.  
 
During Chen Shui-bian‟s era, economic liberalism emerged at first, but was soon taken 
over by economic nationalism. In accordance with economic liberalist thinking, Chen‟s 
administration regarded expansion of cross-Strait economic exchanges as a means to 
maintain peace between Taiwan and China. That‟s why the DPP administration quickly 
replaced Lee‟s policy with its liberal policy of “Active Opening, Effective Management” in 
2001 (Tanner, 2006: 53). However, the seemingly liberal economic policy did not last 
long. In fact, strong economic nationalism came back to dominate Taiwanese authorities‟ 
thinking. China was again considered as a threat to Taiwan‟s national security, thus 
restrictive economic measures were implemented. “Three direct links” continued to be 
prohibited, and in 2006, Chen‟s government changed the policy to “Active Management, 
Effective Opening”, aiming at tightening up the supervision of Taiwanese investment in 
China (MAC, 2006b). In Chen‟s government, initially liberal economic and later restrictive 
measures were believed to be significant means to protect Taiwan‟s national interests.  
 
In Ma Ying-jeou‟s era, liberal economic nationalism dominated the government‟s 
approaches in managing cross-Strait commerical relations. In less than one year‟s time, 
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Ma‟s administration not only solved the “three direct links” issue, but actively promoted 
the negotiations with the Mainland for more mutual economic benefits (MAC, 2009b). 
With the goal of gradually reducing tariffs and liberalisation of commercial transactions, 
the signing of ECFA in 2010 marked a milestone in cross-Strait economic relations, as 
the commercial ties of the two sides were officially liberalised (MAC, 2012a). Yet, the 
creation of a more favourable environment for cross-Strait economic relations actually 
served three nationalist goals: maintaining peace, increasing Taiwan‟s economic 
standing and participating in more international activities. Although Ma‟s administration 
adopted different techniques from the previous administrations, it still aimed at achieving 
the same ends of bolstering Taiwan‟s power and prestige.  
 
By examining three periods of time, this thesis has revealed that Taiwan‟s cross-Strait 
economic approaches switched from aggressive nationalism to liberal nationalism. 
Despite different economic strategies used, all three governments were motivated by the 
same nationalist reason: protecting Taiwan‟s security and maintaining its „sovereignty‟. 
The economic means did vary from strong protectionism to gradual liberal policies. 
However, the purpose of safeguarding Taiwan‟s national interests remained the same 
over the past twenty years.  
 
THE IMPORTANCE OF CHINA  
The central conclusion that may be drawn from my study is that China‟s rise, the external 
factor, accounts for Taiwan‟s changing cross-Strait economic policymaking. In all three 
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administrations, Taiwan‟s domestic politics concern stemmed from an economically, 
diplomatically and militarily stronger China.  
 
In Lee‟s era, the national security concern came from China‟s rapidly growing power. Its 
rapid economic development not only attracted many Taiwanese corporations, but 
enabled China to diplomatically isolate and militarily intimidate Taiwan. During Chen‟s 
Presidency, an economically more global integrated China became irresistible to 
Taiwanese businessmen, thus created its image as an opportunity to the DPP authority. 
Meanwhile, China‟s increasing diplomatic influence and military advancement as well as 
Taiwan‟s economic over-dependence on China increased the DPP‟s anxiety, thus 
changing its perception on China from an opportunity to a threat. In Ma‟s administration, 
a more confident China as a result of its increasing power in all terms made Taiwan 
realise its vast power disadvantage with China. At this stage, engaging with China 
economically appeared to be a wise option for Taiwan to safeguard its national security 
and restore national pride.  
 
It can be seen that during the administrations of Lee and Chen, it was in the national 
interest for Taiwan to put great barriers in cross-Strait economic exchanges, but during 
Ma‟s Presidency, it seemed to be more in the national interest to encourage economic 
integration. But throughout these three periods of time, Taiwanese government‟s 
economic decisions have been derived from its assessment on China‟s rising power. 
That illustrates the nature of the economic relations between Taiwan and China.  
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CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The thesis suggests a future research agenda for the study of the relationship between a 
minor state and a major state. This study has demonstrated that in the case of Taiwan, 
the Chinese factor has dominated Taiwan‟s cross-Strait economic policymaking. 
Regardless of what policies Taiwanese administrations put forward, their fundamental 
concerns are Taiwan‟s national security and interests. Yet, the source of this concern is 
not from domestic politics, but rather an assessment of China‟s overall power.  
 
While it would be wrong to make generalisations about all the relationships between 
weak and strong states, this study suggests that potentially there is a framework to 
understand the way in which small states embrace policy choices reflecting their regional 
realities with large powerful neighbours. In the relationship, geopolitics potentially 
overrides other considerations such as ideologies and economic benefits. Thus, the 
scholarly task ahead is to explore the relationships of other weak and strong states to 
test this proposition. For instance, nations which are geographically proximate, 
historically connected and culturally affiliated such as Russia and Ukraine, Canada and 
the U.S., Pacific Islands and Australia would make good case studies.  
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